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Abstract
The financial crisis has dramatically demonstrated that the tradi-
tional approach to apply univariate monetary risk measures to single
institutions does not capture sufficiently the perilous systemic risk that
is generated by the interconnectedness of the system entities and the
corresponding contagion effects. This has brought awareness of the
urgent need for novel approaches that capture systemic riskiness. The
purpose of this paper is to specify a general methodological framework
that is flexible enough to cover a wide range of possibilities to de-
sign systemic risk measures via multi-dimensional acceptance sets and
aggregation functions, and to study corresponding examples. Exist-
ing systemic risk measures can usually be interpreted as the minimal
amount of cash needed to secure the system after aggregating individual
risks. In contrast, our approach also includes systemic risk measures
that can be interpreted as the minimal amount of cash that secures
the aggregated system by allocating capital to the single institutions
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before aggregating the individual risks. This allows for a possible rank-
ing of the institutions in terms of systemic riskiness measured by the
optimal allocations. Another important feature of our approach is the
possibility of allocating cash according to the future state of the system
(scenario-dependent allocation). We illustrate with several examples
the advantages of this feature. We also provide conditions which ensure
monotonicity, convexity, or quasi-convexity properties of our systemic
risk measures.
Keywords: Systemic risk, risk measures, acceptance set, aggregation.
Mathematics Subject Classification (2010): 60A99; 91B30; 91G99;
93D99.
1 Introduction
A large part of the current literature on systemic financial risk is concerned
with the modeling structure of financial networks and the analysis of the
contagion and the spread of a potential exogenous (or even endogenous)
shock into the system. For a given financial (possibly random) network
and a given random shock one then determines the “cascade” mechanism
which generates possibly many defaults. This mechanism often requires a
detailed description of the balance sheet of each institution; assumptions
on the interbank network and exposures, on the recovery rate at default,
on the liquidation policy; the analysis of direct liabilities, bankruptcy costs,
cross-holdings, leverage structures, fire sales, and liquidity freezes.
Among the many contributions we mention here the classical conta-
gion model proposed by Eisenberg and Noe [2001], the default model of
Gai and Kapadia [2010a], the illiquidity cascade models of Gai and Kapadia
[2010b], Hurd et al. [2014] and Lee [2013], the asset fire sale cascade model
by Cifuentes et al. [2005] and Caccioli et al. [2012], as well as the model
in Awiszus and Weber [2015] that additionally includes cross-holdings. For
an exhaustive reference on the literature we defer the reader to the recent
volume: “Contagion! The Spread of Systemic Risk in Financial Networks”,
Hurd [2015].
These approaches may be relevant also from the viewpoint of a policy
maker that has to intervene and regulate the banking system to reduce the
risk that, in case of an adverse (local) shock, a substantial part or even the
complete system breaks down.
However, once such a model for the financial network has been identified
and the mechanism for the spread of the contagion determined, one still has
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to understand how to compare the possible final outcomes in a reasonable
way or, in other words, how to measure the risk carried by the global financial
system. This is the focus of our approach, as we measure the risk embedded
in a financial system taking as primitive a vector X = (X1, . . . ,XN ) of
positions, where Xi represents the position of institution i. Our approach is
very close in spirit to the “classical” conceptual framework initiated by the
seminal paper by Artzner et al. [1999] and that has been recently adopted
also to analyze systemic risk by Chen et al. [2013], Kromer et al. [2013] and
Hoffmann et al. [2014].
We recall this classical approach, in the case of one single institution, by the
following two quotes from Artzner et al. [1999]:
“The basic objects of our study shall therefore be the random variables
on the set of states of nature at a future date, interpreted as possible future
values of positions or portfolios currently held.”
...
“These measures of risk can be used as (extra) capital requirements to
regulate the risk assumed by market participants, traders, and insurance
underwriters, as well as to allocate existing capital.”
Of course one main difference is that we have to take into consideration not
just one single institution but the global system and in this paper we will
illustrate how to achieve this in an appropriate way. We interpret Xi as the
profits and losses of institution i at a future time T , precisely as the gain if
Xi is positive or as the loss if Xi is negative. Such profit and loss is typically
uncertain and therefore it will be modeled by a random variable Xi(ω) on
some space of possible scenarios ω ∈ Ω.
To summarize, we consider the random vector X = (X1, . . . ,XN ) as
primitive: One may interpret it as a “reduced form model” of a complex
financial system without reference to a specific structural network model,
and consequently X may already comprehend the potential risk of a conta-
gion spread into the system. Otherwise one may also interpret X as the net
worth of the positions before the contagion takes place and then the con-
tagion mechanism will be embedded in the risk measure via an aggregation
function (as in the model of Eisenberg and Noe [2001]). Either way, our
scope is to provide a consistent criterion to asses wether one possible vector
X is riskier than another.
3
1.1 From one-dimensional to N-dimensional risk profiles
In this subsection we review the literature on risk measurement based on
acceptable sets, both in the traditional one-dimensional setting as well as
in the case of N interacting financial institutions. Here we denote with
L0(RN ) := L0(Ω,F ;RN ), N ∈ N, the space of RN -valued random variables
on the probability space (Ω,F ,P).
Traditional risk management strategies of financial systems have pre-
dominantly focused on the solvency of individual institutions as if they were
in isolation. A typical approach is to evaluate the risk η(Xi) of each institu-
tion i ∈ {1, ...N} by applying a univariate monetary risk measure η to the
single financial positions. A monetary risk measure (see Fo¨llmer and Schied
[2004]) is a map η : L0(R) → R that can be interpreted as the minimal
capital needed to secure a financial position with payoff X ∈ L0(R), i.e. the
minimal amount m ∈ R that must be added to X in order to make the
resulting (discounted) payoff at time T acceptable:
η(X) := inf{m ∈ R | X +m ∈ A}, (1.1)
where the acceptance set A ⊆ L0(R) is assumed to be monotone, i.e. X ≥
Y ∈ A implies X ∈ A. In addition to decreasing monotonicity, the charac-
terizing feature of these maps is the cash additivity property:
η(X +m) = η(X)−m, for all m ∈ R. (1.2)
Under the assumption that the set A is convex (resp. is a convex cone)
the maps in (1.1) are convex (resp. convex and positively homogeneous)
and are called convex (resp. coherent) risk measures, see Artzner et al.
[1999], Fo¨llmer and Schied [2002], Frittelli and Rosazza Gianin [2002]. The
principle that diversification should not increase the risk is mathematically
translated not necessarily with the convexity property but with the weaker
condition of quasiconvexity:
η(λX + (1− λ)Y ) ≤ η(X) ∨ η(Y ).
As a result, in Cerreia-Vioglio et al. [2010] and Frittelli and Maggis [2014],
the only properties assumed in the definition of a quasi-convex risk measure
are monotonicity and quasiconvexity. Such risk measures can always be
written as:
η(X) := inf{m ∈ R | X ∈ Am}, (1.3)
where each set Am ⊆ L0(R) is monotone and convex, for each m. Here
A
m is interpreted as the class of payoffs carrying the same risk level m.
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Contrary to the convex, cash additive case where each random variable is
binary cataloged as acceptable or as not acceptabe, in the quasi-convex case
one admits various degrees of acceptability, described by the risk level m,
see Cherny and Madan [2009]. Furthermore, in the quasi-convex case the
cash additivity property will not hold in general and one looses a direct
interpretation of m as the minimal capital required to secure the payoff X,
but preserves the interpretation of Am as the set of positions acceptable for
the given risk level m. By selecting Am := A−m, the risk measure in (1.1)
is clearly a particular case of the one in (1.3).
However, the financial crisis has dramatically demonstrated that the
traditional approach to apply univariate monetary risk measures to single
institutions does not capture sufficiently the perilous systemic risk that is
generated by the interconnectedness of the system entities and the corre-
sponding contagion effects. This has brought awareness of the urgent need
for novel approaches that capture systemic riskiness, and a rapidly growing
literature is concerned with designing more appropriate risk measures for
financial systems. A systemic risk measure is then a map ρ : L0(RN ) → R
that evaluates the risk ρ(X) of the complete system X of financial positions.
Most of the systemic risk measures in the existing literature are of the form
ρ(X) = η(Λ(X)), (1.4)
where η : L0(R)→ R is a univariate risk measure and
Λ : RN → R
is an aggregation rule that aggregates the N -dimensional risk factor X into
a univariate risk factor Λ(X) representing the total risk in the system. Some
examples of aggregation rules found in the literature are the following:
• In general, one of the most common ways to aggregate multivariate
risk is to simply sum the single risk factors: Λ(x) =
∑N
i=1 xi, x =
(x1, ..., xN ) ∈ RN . Also in the literature on systemic risk measures
there are examples using this aggregation rule, like for example the
Systemic Expected Shortfall introduced in Acharya et al. [2010], or the
Contagion Value at Risk (CoVaR) introduced in Adrian and Brunnermeier
[2011]. However, while summing up profit and loss positions might be
reasonable from the viewpoint of a portfolio manager where the port-
folio components compensate each other, this aggregation rule seems
inappropriate for a financial system where cross-subsidization between
institutions is rather unrealistic. Further, if the sum was a suitable ag-
gregation of risk in financial systems, then the traditional approach of
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applying a univariate coherent risk measure η to the single risk factors
would be sufficiently prudential in the sense that by sub-linearity it
holds that η(
∑N
i=1Xi) ≤
∑N
i=1 η(Xi).
• One possible aggregation that takes the lack of cross-subsidization
between financial institutions into account is to sum up losses only:
Λ(x) =
∑N
i=1−x−i . This kind of aggregation is for example used in
Huang et al. [2009], Lehar [2005]. See also Brunnermeier and Cheridito
[2013] for an extension of this type of aggregation rule that also consid-
ers a certain effect of gains, as Λ(x) =
∑N
i=1−αix−i +
∑N
i=1 βi(xi−vi)+
for some αi, βi, vi ∈ R+, i = 1, · · · , N .
• Beside the lack of cross-subsidization in a financial system, the ag-
gregation rule may also accounts for contagion effects that can con-
siderably accelerate systemwide losses resulting from an initial shock.
Motivated by the structural contagion model of Eisenberg and Noe
[2001], in Chen et al. [2013] they introduce an aggregation function
that explicitly models the net systemic cost of the contagion in a fi-
nancial system by defining the aggregation rule
ΛCM (x) = min
yi≥xi+
∑N
j=1 Πijyj ,∀i=1,··· ,N, y∈RN+
{
N∑
i=1
yi
}
.
Here, Π = (Πij)i,j=1,··· ,N represents the relative liability matrix, i.e.firm
i has to pay the proportion Πij of its total liabilities to firm j.
In the literature there are various extensions of the structural con-
tagion model of Eisenberg and Noe [2001] and the corresponding ag-
gregation rule that take into account further contagion channels of
systemic risk such as effects from firesales or liquidity freezes, see e.g.
Amini et al. [2013], Awiszus and Weber [2015], Cifuentes et al. [2005],
Gai and Kapadia [2010a].
An axiomatic characterization of systemic risk measures of the form (1.4) on
a finite state space is provided in Chen et al. [2013], see also Kromer et al.
[2013] for the extension to a general probability space and Hoffmann et al.
[2014] for a further extension to a conditional setting. Also, in these ref-
erences further examples of possible aggregation functions can be found.
Our framework may accommodate also such aggregation functions, provided
these satisfy the (simple) conditions outlined in Section 3.
If η in (1.4) is a monetary risk measure it follows from (1.1) that we can
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rewrite the systemic risk measure ρ in (1.4) as
ρ(X) := inf{m ∈ R | Λ(X) +m ∈ A} . (1.5)
Thus, presuming Λ(X) represents some loss, systemic risk can again be
interpreted as the minimal cash amount that secures the system when it is
added to the total aggregated system loss Λ(X). If Λ(X) does not allow for
an interpretation as cash, the risk measure in (1.5) has to be understood as
some general risk level of the system rather than some capital requirement.
Similarly, if η is a quasi-convex risk measure the systemic risk measure ρ in
(1.4) can be rewritten as
ρ(X) := inf{m ∈ R | Λ(X) ∈ Am}. (1.6)
Again one first aggregates the risk factors via the function Λ and in a second
step one computes the minimal risk level associated to Λ(X).
While the approach prescribed in (1.5) and (1.6) defines an interesting class
of systemic risk measures, one could think of meaningful alternative or ex-
tended procedures of measuring systemic risk not captured by (1.5) or (1.6).
The purpose of this paper is to specify a general methodological framework
that is flexible enough to cover a wide range of possibilities to design sys-
temic risk measures via acceptance sets and aggregation functions and to
study corresponding examples. In the following subsections we extend the
conceptual framework for systemic risk measures via acceptance sets step by
step in order to gradually include certain novel key features of our approach.
1.2 First add capital, then aggregate
The interpretation of (1.5) to measure systemic risk as minimal capital
needed to secure the system after aggregating individual risks is for example
meaningful in the situation where some kind of rescue fund shall be installed
to repair damage from systemic loss. However, for instance from the view-
point of a regulator that has the possibility to intervene on the level of the
single institutions before contagion effects generate further losses it might be
more relevant to measure systemic risk as the minimal capital that secures
the aggregated system by injecting the capital into the single institutions
before aggregating the individual risks. This way of measuring systemic risk
can be expressed by
ρ(X) := inf{
N∑
i=1
mi |m = (m1, ...,mN ) ∈ RN , Λ(X+m) ∈ A} . (1.7)
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Here, the amount mi is added to the financial position X
i of institution
i ∈ {1, ..., N} before the corresponding total loss Λ(X+m) is computed. For
example, considering the aggregation function ΛCM from above it becomes
clear that injecting cash first might prevent further losses that would be
generated by contagion effects. The systemic risk is then measured as the
minimal total amountl
∑N
i=1mi injected into the institutions to secure the
system. 1
Another interesting feature of the approach in (1.7) is that it delivers at the
same time a measure of total systemic risk as well as a potential ranking
of the institutions in terms of systemic riskiness. Indeed, for X given, let
m∗ = (m∗1, ...,m
∗
N ) be such that ρ(X) =
∑N
i=1m
∗
i and denote the ordered
cash allocations by m∗i1 ≥ ... ≥ m∗iN . Then, one could argue that the risk
factor Xi1 that requires the biggest cash allocation m∗i1 corresponds to the
systemic riskiest institution, Xi2 corresponds to the systemic second riskiest
institution, and so on. Of course, such allocation m∗ does not need to be
unique, in which case one has to discuss criteria that justify the choice of a
specific allocation.
1.3 First add scenario-dependent allocation, then aggregate
One main novelty of this paper is that we want to allow for the possibility
of adding to X not merely a vector m = (m1, ...,mN ) ∈ RN of cash but a
random vector
Y ∈ C ⊆ L0(RN )
which represents admissible assets with possibly random payoffs at time
T , in the spirit of Frittelli and Scandolo [2006]. To each Y ∈ C we assign a
measure π(Y) of the risk (or cost) associated toY determined by a monotone
increasing map
π : C → R . (1.8)
This leads to the following extension of (1.7):
ρ(X) := inf{π(Y) ∈ R | Y ∈ C, Λ(X+Y) ∈ A} . (1.9)
Note that in order to establish a ranking of the institutions in a system
X in terms of systemic riskiness implied by a Y∗ = (Y ∗1 , ..., Y
∗
N ) ∈ C with
ρ(X) = π(Y∗) in analogy to the ranking process described above implied
by a deterministic m∗ = (m∗1, ...,m
∗
N ) one now first has to introduce an or-
dering of the Y ∗1 , ..., Y
∗
N . For example, one could say X
i is systemic riskier
1Independently a related concept in the context of set-valued systemic risk measures
has been developed in Feinstein et al. [2015].
8
than Xj if E[Y ∗i ] > E[Y
∗
j ], presumed the expectations E[Y
∗
i ], i = 1, ..., N
are well defined.
Considering a general set C in (1.9) allows for more general measurement
of systemic risk than the cash needed today for each institution to secure
the system. For example, C could be a set of (vectors of) general admissi-
ble financial assets that can be used to secure a system by adding Y to X
component-wise, and π(Y) is a valuation of Y. Another example that we fo-
cus on in this paper and which is particularly interesting from the viewpoint
of a lender of last resort is the following class of sets C:
C ⊆ {Y ∈ L0(RN ) |
N∑
n=1
Y n ∈ R} =: CR, (1.10)
and π(Y) =
∑N
n=1 Y
n. Here the notation
∑N
n=1 Y
n ∈ R means that∑N
n=1 Y
n is equal to some deterministic constant in R, even though each
single Y n, n = 1, · · · , N , is a random variable. Then, as in (1.7) the sys-
temic risk measure
ρ(X) := inf{
N∑
n=1
Y n | Y ∈ C, Λ(X+Y) ∈ A} (1.11)
can still be interpreted as the minimal total cash amount
∑N
n=1 Y
n ∈ R
needed today to secure the system by distributing the cash at the future
time T among the components of the risk vector X. However, contrary
to (1.7), in general the allocation Y i(ω) to institution i does not need to
be decided today but depends on the scenario ω that has been realized at
time T . This corresponds to the situation of a lender of last resort who
is equipped with a certain amount of cash today and who will allocate it
according to where it serves the most depending on the scenario that has
been realized. Restrictions on the possible distributions of cash are given
by the set C. For example, for C = RN the situation corresponds to (1.7)
where the distribution is already determined today, while for C = CR the
distribution can be chosen completely freely depending on the scenario ω
that has been realized (including negative amounts, i.e. withdrawals of cash
from certain components).
Section 4, 5, and 6 will be devoted to the analysis and concrete examples of
the class of systemic risk measures using a set C as in (1.10). We will see
that in the case C = CR where unrestricted cross-subsidization is possible
the canonical way of measuring systemic risk measure is of the form (1.4)
with aggregation rule Λ(x) =
∑N
i=1 xi, x ∈ RN , i.e. to apply a univariate
risk measure to the sum of the risk factors. Another interesting feature
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of allowing scenario depending allocations of cash Y ∈ C ⊆ CR is that in
general the systemic risk measure will take the dependence structure of the
components of X into account even though acceptable positions might be
defined in terms of the marginal distributions of Xi, i = 1, ..., N only. For
instance, the example in Section 5 employs the aggregation rule Λ(x) =∑N
i=1−x−i , x ∈ RN , and the acceptance set Aγ := {Z ∈ L0(R) | E[Z] ≥
γ} , γ ∈ R. Then a risk vector Z = (Z1, ..., ZN ) ∈ L0(RN ) is acceptable if
and only if Λ(Z) ∈ A, i.e.
N∑
i=1
−E[Z−i ] ≥ γ ,
which only depends on the marginal distributions of Z. Thus, if we choose
C = RN then it is obvious that in this case also the systemic risk measure
ρ(X) in (1.11) depends on the marginal distributions of X only. If, however,
one allows for more general allocations Y ∈ C ⊆ CR that might differ from
scenario to scenario the systemic risk measure will in general depend on the
multivariate distribution of X since it can play on the dependence of the
components of X to minimize the costs.
1.4 Multi-dimensional Acceptance Sets
Until now we have always defined systemic risk measures in terms of accept-
ability of an aggregated, one-dimensional loss figure. However, not necessar-
ily every relevant systemic risk measure is of this aggregated type. Consider
for instance the popular approach (though possibly problematic for financial
systems as explained above) to add single univariate monetary risk measures
ηi, i = 1, ..., N , i.e.
ρ(X) :=
N∑
i=1
ηi(X
i) . (1.12)
In general, the systemic risk measure in (1.12) cannot be expressed in the
form (1.9). Denoting by Ai ⊆ L0(R) the acceptance set of ηi, i = 1, ..., N ,
one easily sees from (1.1), however, that ρ in (1.12) can be written in terms
of the multivariate acceptance set A1 × ...× AN :
ρ(X) := inf{
N∑
i=1
mi | m = (m1, ...,mN ) ∈ RN , X+m ∈ A1 × ...× AN} .
Motivated by this example, we extend (1.9) to the formulation of systemic
risk measures as the minimal cost of admissible asset vectors Y ∈ C that,
when added to the vector of financial positions X, makes the augmented
10
financial positions X+Y acceptable in terms of a general multidimensional
acceptance set A ⊆ L0(RN ):
ρ(X) := inf{π(Y) ∈ R | Y ∈ C, X+Y ∈ A} . (1.13)
Note that by putting A := {Z ∈ L0(RN ) | Λ(Z) ∈ A} Definition (1.9) is a
special case of (1.13). Also, in analogy to (1.2), we remark that for lin-
ear valuation rules π the systemic risk measure given in (1.13) exhibits an
extended type of cash invariance in the sense that
ρ(X+Y) = ρ(X) + π(Y) (1.14)
for Y ∈ C such that Y′ ±Y ∈ C for all Y′ ∈ C, see Frittelli and Scandolo
[2006].
1.5 Degree of Acceptability
In order to reach the final, most general formulation of systemic risk mea-
sures, we assign, in analogy to (1.3), to each Y ∈ C a set AY ⊆ L0(RN ) of
risk vectors that are acceptable for the given (random) vector Y, and define
the systemic risk measure by:
ρ(X) := inf{π(Y) ∈ R | Y ∈ C, X ∈ AY} . (1.15)
Note that analogously to the one-dimensional quasi-convex case (1.3), the
systemic risk measures (1.15) cannot necessarily be interpreted as cash added
to the system but in general represents some minimal aggregated risk level
π(Y) at which the system X is acceptable. The approach in (1.15) is very
flexible and unifies a variety of different features in the design of systemic
risk measures. In particular, it includes all previous cases if we set
AY := A−Y,
where the set A ⊆ L0(RN ) represents acceptable risk vectors. Then obvi-
ously (1.13) is obtained from (1.15).
Another advantage of the formulation in terms of general acceptance sets
is the possibility to design systemic risk measures via general aggregation
rules. Indeed the formulation (1.15) includes the case
ρ(X) := inf{π(Y) ∈ R | Y ∈ C, Θ(X,Y) ∈ A}, (1.16)
where Θ : L0(RN ) × C → L0(R) denotes some aggregation function jointly
in X and Y. Just select AY := {Z ∈ L0(RN ) | Θ(Z,Y) ∈ A} . In particu-
lar, (1.16) includes both the case “injecting capital before aggregation”as in
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(1.7) and (1.9) by putting Θ(X,Y) =Λ(X+Y), and the case “aggregation
before injecting capital”as in (1.5) by putting Θ(X,Y) :=Λ1(X)+Λ2(Y),
where Λ1 : L0(RN )→ L0(R) is an aggregation function and Λ2 : C → L0(R)
could be, for example, the discounted cost of Y.
Also, again in analogy to the one-dimensional case (1.3), the more general
dependence of the acceptance set onY in (1.15) allows for multi-dimensional
quasi-convex risk measures. Note that the cash additivity property (1.14)
is then lost in general.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next Section we
structure and lay the theoretical foundations of the approach to systemic
risk measures motivated and outlined above. In particular, we provide rea-
sonable conditions on the ingredients C, π, A, A, and Λ such that the above
definitions of ρ are well posed and ρ has the natural properties of decreasing
monotonicity and quasi-convexity (or convexity). In Section 3 we analyze
the situation and give various families of systemic risk measures when the
risk measurement is defined in terms of the natural approach to apply some
kind of aggregation to risk factors and test acceptability with respect to
some one-dimensional acceptance set as in (1.16) above. Section 4 inves-
tigates the interesting class of systemic risk measures that are defined in
terms of a set C of scenario-dependent allocations as in (1.10). Then we
present two concrete examples within this class of systemic risk measures
in Sections 5 and 6. In Section 5 we look Gaussian systems and consider
both deterministic cash allocations as well as a certain class of random cash
allocations. Further, we apply the results to a particular Gaussian system
where the flow of money between the institutions (borrowing and lending)
is modeled by a system of interacting diffusions (see Carmona et al. [2015]).
In Section 6 we introduce an example on a finite probability space. As a
consequence of the finite probability space we are able to compute systemic
risk measures for very general random cash allocations C ⊆ CR.
2 Definition of Systemic Risk Measures and Prop-
erties
In this Section we provide the definitions and properties of the systemic
risk measures in our setting. As in the Introduction, we consider the set of
random vectors
L0(RN ) := {X = (X1, . . . ,XN ) | Xn ∈ L0(Ω,F ,P), n = 1, · · · , N},
on the probability space (Ω,F ,P). We assume that L0(RN ) is equipped
with an order relation  such that it is a vector lattice. One such example
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is provided by the order relation: X1  X2 if Xi1 ≥ Xi2 for all components
i = 1, ..., N , where for random variables on L0(R), the order relation is
determined by P−a.s inequality.
Definition 2.1 Let X1, X2 ∈ L0(RN ).
1. A set A ⊂ L0(RN ) is  -monotone if X1 ∈ A and X2  X1 implies
X2 ∈ A.
2. A map f : L0(RN ) → L0(R) is -monotone decreasing if X2  X1
implies f(X1) ≥ f(X2). Analogously for functions f : L0(RN )→ R.
3. A map f : L0(RN )→ R is quasi-convex if
f(λX1 + (1− λ)X2) ≤ f(X1) ∨ f(X2).
A vector X = (X1, . . . ,XN ) ∈ L0(RN ) denotes a configuration of risky
factors at a future time T associated to a system of N entities. Let
C ⊆ L0(RN ).
To each Y ∈ C we assign a set AY ⊆ L0(RN ). The set AY represents the
risk vectors X that are acceptable for the given random vector Y. Let also
consider a map
π : C → R ,
so that π(Y) represents the risk (or cost) associated to Y.
We now introduce the concept of monotone and (quasi-) convex systemic
risk measure.
Definition 2.2 The systemic risk measure associated with C,AY and π is
a map ρ : L0(RN )→ R := R ∪ {−∞} ∪ {∞}, defined by:
ρ(X) := inf{π(Y) ∈ R | Y ∈ C, X ∈ AY} . (2.1)
Moreover ρ is called a quasi-convex (resp. convex) systemic risk measure if it
is -monotone decreasing and quasi-convex (resp. convex on {ρ(X) < +∞}).
In other words, the systemic risk of a random vector X is measured by the
minimal risk (cost) of those random vectors Y that make X acceptable.
As already sketched in the Introduction, we now focus on several examples
of systemic risk measures of the type (2.1). To guarantee that such maps are
finite valued one could consider their restriction to some vector subspaces
of L0(RN ) (for examples Lp(RN ), p ∈ [1,∞]) and impose further conditions
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on the defining ingredients (π, C, AY) of ρ. For example, suppose that C
and AY satisfy the two conditions{
m1 ∈RN | m ∈ R+, 1 := (1, ...,1)
} ⊆ C,
−m1 ∈ Am1 and Am1 is a monotone set for each m ∈ R+,
then ρ : L∞(RN ) → R defined by (2.1) satisfies ρ(X) < +∞ for all X ∈
L∞(RN ). Indeed, for m := maxi ‖Xi‖∞, X ≥ −m1 ∈ Am1 implies that
X ∈Am1 and π(m1) < +∞.
Clearly, other sufficient conditions may be obtained in each specific example
of systemic risk measures considered in the subsequent Sections.
We opt to accept the possibility that such maps ρ may assume values ±∞.
However, it is not difficult to find simple sufficient conditions assuring that
the systemic risk measure in (2.1) is proper (not identically equal to +∞).
One such example is the condition:
if 0 ∈ C and 0 ∈ A0 then ρ(0) ≤ π(0) < +∞.
We now consider the “structural properties” (i.e. monotonicity, quasicon-
vexity, convexity) of our systemic risk measures and introduce two sets of
conditions (properties (P1), (P2) and (P3) below and the alternative proper-
ties (P2a) and (P3a) ) that guarantee that the map in (2.1) is a quasi-convex
(or convex) risk measure. In Section 3 we show that these sets of conditions
can be easily checked in some relevant examples of maps in the form (2.1),
where the set AY is determined from aggregation and one-dimensional ac-
ceptance sets.
We introduce the following properties:
(P1) For all Y ∈ C the set AY ⊂ L0(RN ) is -monotone.
(P2) For all m ∈ R, for all Y1,Y2 ∈ C such that π(Y1) ≤ m and
π(Y2) ≤ m and for all X1 ∈ AY1 , X2 ∈ AY2 and all λ ∈ [0, 1] there
exists Y ∈ C such that π(Y) ≤ m and λX1 + (1− λ)X2 ∈ AY.
(P3) For all Y1,Y2 ∈ C and all X1 ∈ AY1 , X2 ∈ AY2 and all λ ∈ [0, 1]
there exists Y ∈ C such that π(Y) ≤ λπ(Y1) + (1 − λ)π(Y2) and
λX1 + (1− λ)X2 ∈ AY.
It is clear that property (P3) implies property (P2). Moreover, we have:
Lemma 2.3 i) If the systemic risk measure ρ defined in (2.1) satisfies
the properties (P1) and (P2), then ρ is -monotone decreasing and
quasi-convex.
14
ii) If the systemic risk measure ρ defined in (2.1) satisfies the proper-
ties (P1) and (P3), then ρ is -monotone decreasing and convex on
{ρ(X) < +∞}.
Proof. Set
B(X) :=
{
Y ∈ C | X ∈ AY} .
First assume that property (P1) holds and w.l.o.g. suppose X2  X1 and
B(X1) 6= ∅. Then property (P1) implies that if X1 ∈ AY and X2  X1
then: B(X1) ⊆ B(X2). Hence:
ρ(X1) = inf{π(Y) | Y ∈ B(X1)} ≥ inf{π(Y) | Y ∈ B(X2)} = ρ(X2)
so that ρ is -monotone decreasing.
i) Now assume that property (P2) holds and let X1,X2 ∈ L0(RN ) be
arbitrarily chosen. For the quasi-convexity we need to prove, for any
m ∈ R, that:
ρ(X1) ≤ m and ρ(X2) ≤ m⇒ ρ(λX1 + (1− λ)X2) ≤ m.
By definition of the infimum in the definition of ρ(Xi), ∀ε > 0 there
exist Yi ∈ C such that Xi ∈ AYi and
π(Yi) ≤ ρ(Xi) + ε ≤ m+ ε, i = 1, 2.
Take any λ ∈ [0, 1]. Property (P2) guarantees the existence of Z ∈ C
such that π(Z) ≤ m+ ε and λX1 + (1− λ)X2 ∈ AZ. Hence
ρ(λX1 + (1− λ)X2) = inf{π(Y) | Y ∈ C, λX1 + (1− λ)X2 ∈ AY}
≤ π(Z) ≤ m+ ε.
As this holds for any ε > 0, we obtain the quasi-convexity.
ii) Assume that property (P3) holds and that X1,X2 ∈ L0(RN ) satisfy
ρ(Xi) < +∞. Then B(Xi) 6= ∅ and, as before, ∀ε > 0 there exists
Yi ∈ L0(RN ) such that: Yi ∈ C, Xi ∈ AYi and
π(Yi) ≤ ρ(Xi) + ε, i = 1, 2. (2.2)
By property (P3) there exists Z ∈ C such that π(Z) ≤ λπ(Y1) + (1−
λ)π(Y2) and λX1 + (1− λ)X2 ∈ AZ. Hence
ρ(λX1 + (1− λ)X2) = inf{π(Y) | Y ∈ C, λX1 + (1− λ)X2 ∈ AY}
≤ π(Z) ≤ λπ(Y1) + (1− λ)π(Y2)
≤ λρ(X1) + (1− λ)ρ(X2) + ǫ,
from (2.2). As this holds for any ε > 0, the map ρ is convex on
{ρ(X) < +∞}.
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We now consider the following alternative properties:
(P2a) For all Y1,Y2 ∈ C, X1 ∈ AY1 , X2 ∈ AY2 and λ ∈ [0, 1] there
exists α ∈ [0, 1] such that λX1 + (1− λ)X2 ∈ AαY1+(1−α)Y2 .
(P3a) For all Y1,Y2 ∈ C, X1 ∈ AY1 , X2 ∈ AY2 and λ ∈ [0, 1] it holds:
λX1 + (1− λ)X2 ∈ AλY1+(1−λ)Y2 .
It is clear that property (P3a) implies property (P2a). Furthermore we
introduce the following properties for C and π:
(P4) C is convex,
(P5) π is quasi-convex,
(P6) π is convex.
We have the following:
Lemma 2.4 i) Under the conditions (P1), (P2a), (P4), and (P5) the
map ρ defined in (2.1) is a quasi-convex systemic risk measure.
ii) Under the conditions (P1), (P3a) , (P4) and (P6) the map ρ defined
in (2.1) is a convex systemic risk measure.
Proof.
i) It follows from Lemma 2.3 and the fact that the properties (P2a), (P4),
and (P5) imply (P2). Indeed, let Y1,Y2 ∈ C such that π(Y1) ≤ m,
π(Y2) ≤ m and let X1 ∈ AY1 , X2 ∈ AY2 and λ ∈ [0, 1]. Then
there exists α ∈ [0, 1] such that λX1 + (1− λ)X2 ∈ AαY1+(1−α)Y2 . If
we set: Y :=αY1 + (1 − α)Y2 ∈ C then λX1 + (1 − λ)X2 ∈ AY and
π(αY1 + (1− α)Y2) ≤ max(π(Y1), π(Y2)) ≤ m.
ii) It follows from Lemma 2.3 and the fact that the properties (P3a) ,
(P4), and (P6) imply (P3). Indeed, let Y1,Y2 ∈ C and let X1 ∈ AY1 ,
X2 ∈ AY2 and λ ∈ [0, 1]. If we set: Y :=λY1 + (1 − λ)Y2 ∈ C then
λX1 + (1− λ)X2 ∈ AY and π(Y) ≤ λπ(Y1) + (1− λ)π(Y2).
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3 Systemic Risk Measures via Aggregation and
One-dimensional Acceptance Sets
In this Section we study four classes of systemic risk measures in the form
(2.1), which differ from each other by the definition of their aggregation
functions and their acceptance sets. However, these four classes, defined
in equations (3.2), (3.3), (3.6), (3.7), all satisfy the structural properties of
monotonicity and quasi-convexity (or convexity). We consider the following
definitions and assumptions, which will hold true throughout this Section:
1. the aggregation functions are
Λ : L0(RN )× C → L0(R),
Λ1 : L0(RN )→ L0(R),
and we assume that Λ1 is -increasing and concave;
2. the acceptance family
(Bx)x∈R
is an increasing family with respect to x and each set Bx ⊆ L0(R) is
assumed monotone and convex;
3. the acceptance subset
A ⊆ L0(R).
is assumed monotone and convex.
The convexity of the acceptance set A ⊆ L0(R) (or of the acceptance fam-
ily (Bx)x∈R) are the standard conditions which have been assumed since
the origin of the theory of risk measures. The concavity of the aggregation
functions is justified, not only from the many relevant examples in litera-
ture, but also by the preservation of the convexity from one dimensional
acceptance sets to multi-dimensional ones. Indeed, let Θ : L0(RN )→ L0(R)
be an aggregation function, A ⊆ L0(R) a one dimensional acceptance set
and define A ⊆ L0(RN ) as the inverse image A := Θ−1(A). Suppose that Θ
is increasing and concave. Then one may easily check that if A is monotone
and convex, then A is monotone and convex.
We note that in all results of this Section, the selection of the set C ⊆ L0(RN )
of permitted vectors is left as general as possible (in some cases we require the
convexity of C and only in Proposition 3.6 we further ask that C+RN+ ∈ C).
Therefore, we are very flexible in the choice of C and we may interpret its
elements as vectors of admissible or safe financial assets, or merely as cash
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vectors. Only in the next Section we attribute a particular structure to C.
In the conclusive statements of the following propositions in this section we
apply Lemma 2.3 and Lemma 2.4 without explicit mention.
Proposition 3.1 Let
AY := {Z ∈ L0(RN ) | Λ(Z,Y) ∈ A} , Y ∈C, (3.1)
Λ be concave, and Λ(·,Y) be -increasing for all Y ∈ C. Then AY satisfies
properties (P1) and (P3a) (and (P2a)). The map ρ defined in (2.1) is given
by
ρ(X) := inf{π(Y) ∈ R | Y ∈ C, Λ(X,Y) ∈ A} , (3.2)
and is a quasi-convex systemic risk measure, under the assumptions (P4)
and (P5); it is a convex systemic risk measure under the assumptions (P4)
and (P6).
Proof. Property (P1): Let X1 ∈ AY and X2  X1. Note that X1 ∈ AY
implies Λ(X1,Y) ∈ A and X2  X1 implies Λ(X2,Y) ≥Λ(X1,Y). Since A
is monotone we have Λ(X2,Y) ∈ A and X2 ∈ AY.
Property (P3a) : Let Y1,Y2 ∈ C, X1 ∈ AY1 , X2 ∈ AY2 and λ ∈ [0, 1].
Then Λ(X1,Y1) ∈ A and Λ(X2,Y2) ∈ A and the convexity of A guarantees:
λΛ(X1,Y1) + (1− λ)Λ(X2,Y2) ∈ A.
From the concavity of Λ(·, ·) we obtain:
Λ(λ(X1,Y1) + (1− λ)(X2,Y2)) ≥ λΛ(X1,Y1) + (1− λ)Λ(X2,Y2) ∈ A.
The monotonicity of A implies:
Λ(λX1+(1−λ)X2, λY1+(1−λ)Y2) =Λ(λ(X1,Y1) + (1−λ)(X2,Y2)) ∈ A,
and therefore, λX1+(1− λ)X2 ∈ AλY1+(1−λ)Y2 .
The class of systemic risk measures defined in (3.2) is a fairly general rep-
resentation since the aggregation function Λ needs only to be concave and
increasing in one of its arguments and the acceptance set A is only required
to be monotone and convex. As shown in the following Corollary 3.2, such a
risk measure may describe either the possibility of “first aggregate and sec-
ond add the capital”(for example if Λ(X,Y) :=Λ1(X)+Λ2(Y), where Λ2(Y)
could be interpreted as the discounted cost of Y) or the case of “first add
and second aggregate”(for example if Λ(X,Y) :=Λ1(X+Y)).
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Corollary 3.2 Let Λ2 : C → L0(R) be concave, let AY be defined in (3.1),
where the function Λ has one of the following forms:
Λ(Z,Y) = Λ1(Z) + Λ2(Y),
Λ(Z,Y) = Λ1(Z+Y).
Then, AY fulfills properties (P1) and (P3a) . Therefore, the map ρ defined
in (3.2) is a quasi-convex systemic risk measure under the assumptions (P4)
and (P5); it is a convex systemic risk measure under the assumptions (P4)
and (P6).
We now turn to the class of truly quasi-convex systemic risk measures defined
by (3.3), which represents the generalization of the quasi-convex risk measure
in (1.6) in the one-dimensional case.
Proposition 3.3 Let θ : C → R. Then the set
AY :=
{
Z ∈ L0(RN ) | Λ1(Z) ∈ Bθ(Y)
}
, Y ∈C,
satisfies properties (P1) and (P2a). The map ρ defined in (2.1) is given by
ρ(X) := inf{π(Y) ∈ R | Y ∈ C, Λ1(X) ∈ Bθ(Y)} , (3.3)
and under the assumptions (P4) and (P5) is a quasi-convex systemic risk
measure.
Proof. Property (P1): Let X1 ∈ AY and X2  X1. Note that X1 ∈ AY
implies Λ1(X1) ∈ Bθ(Y) and X2  X1 implies Λ1(X2) ≥Λ1(X1). Since Bx
is a monotone set for all x, we have Λ1(X2) ∈ Bθ(Y) and X2 ∈ AY.
Property (P2a): Fix Y1,Y2 ∈ C, X1 ∈ AY1 , X2 ∈ AY2 and λ ∈ [0, 1].
Then Λ1(X1) ∈ Bθ(Y1) and Λ1(X2) ∈ Bθ(Y2). From the concavity of Λ1 we
obtain:
Λ1(λX1+(1−λ)X2) ≥ λΛ1(X1) + (1−λ)Λ1(X2) ∈ λBθ(Y1)+(1−λ)Bθ(Y2.)
Since (Bx)x∈R is an increasing family and each Bx is convex, we deduce
λBθ(Y1) + (1− λ)Bθ(Y2) ⊆ Bmax{θ(Y1),θ(Y2)}. (3.4)
Suppose that max(θ(Y1),θ(Y2)) = θ(Y1), using the monotonicity of the
set Bθ(Y1) we deduce
Λ1(λX1+(1− λ)X2) ∈ Bθ(Y1),
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and λX1+(1− λ)X2 ∈ AY1 , so that property (P2a) is satisfied with α = 1.
In the risk measure (3.3) we are not allowing to add capital to X before the
aggregation takes place, as the quasi-convexity property of ρ would be lost
in general. Next, we contemplate this possibility (i.e. we consider conditions
of the type Λ(X,Y) ∈ Bθ(Y)) in the systemic risk measures (3.6) and (3.7)
but only under some non trivial restrictions: for the case (3.6) we impose
conditions on the aggregation function Λ that are made explicit in equation
(3.5) and in the Example 3.5. In contrast, for the case (3.7) we consider
a general aggregation function Λ, but we restrict the family of acceptance
sets to Bpi(Y), where π is positively linear and represents the risk level of the
acceptance family.
Proposition 3.4 Let θ : C → R and
AY :=
{
Z ∈ L0(RN ) | Λ(Z,Y) ∈ Bθ(Y)
}
, Y ∈C,
where Λ(·,Y) : L0(RN )→ L0(R) is -increasing and concave for all Y ∈C.
Assume in addition that:
θ(Y2) ≥ θ(Y1)⇒ Λ(X,Y2) ≥Λ(X,Y1) for all X ∈L0(RN ). (3.5)
Then properties (P1) and (P2) hold. The map ρ defined in (2.1) is given by
ρ(X) := inf{π(Y) ∈ R | Y ∈ C, Λ(X,Y) ∈ Bθ(Y)} (3.6)
and is a quasi-convex systemic risk measure.
Proof. Property (P1): Let X1 ∈ AY and X2  X1. Note that X1 ∈ AY
implies Λ(X1,Y) ∈ Bθ(Y) andX2  X1 implies Λ(X2,Y) ≥Λ(X1,Y). Since
Bθ(Y) is a monotone set, we have Λ(X2,Y) ∈ Bθ(Y) and X2 ∈ AY.
Property (P2): Fix m ∈ R, Y1,Y2 ∈ C such that π(Y1) ≤ m and π(Y2) ≤
m, λ ∈ [0, 1] and take X1 ∈ AY1 and X2 ∈ AY2 . Then Λ(X1,Y1) ∈ Bθ(Y1)
and Λ(X2,Y2) ∈ Bθ(Y2). Then, w.l.o.g. we may assume that θ(Y2) ≥
θ(Y1). Since (Bx)x∈R is an increasing family, we have Bθ(Y1) ⊆ Bθ(Y2).
Condition (3.5) implies Λ(X1,Y2) ≥Λ(X1,Y1) ∈ Bθ(Y1) ⊆ Bθ(Y2), so that
Λ(X1,Y2) ∈ Bθ(Y2). From the concavity of Λ(·,Y2) and the convexity of
Bθ(Y2) we obtain:
Λ(λX1+(1− λ)X2,Y2) ≥ λΛ(X1,Y2) + (1− λ)Λ(X2,Y2) ∈ Bθ(Y2).
Hence Λ(λX1+(1 − λ)X2,Y2) ∈ Bθ(Y2) which means: λX1+(1 − λ)X2 ∈
AY2 . Since π(Y2) ≤ m, property (P2) holds with Y = Y2.
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Example 3.5 Let θ : C → R and let Λ be defined by
Λ(X,Y) = g(X, θ(Y)),
where g(·, z) : RN → R is increasing and concave for all z ∈ R and g(x, ·) :
R → R is increasing for all x ∈ RN . Then Λ satisfies all the assumptions
in Proposition 3.4. Examples of functions g satisfying these conditions are:
g(x, z) = f(x) + h(z),
with f increasing and concave and h increasing, or
g(x, z) = f(x)h(z)
with f increasing, concave and positive and h increasing and positive.
Proposition 3.6 Suppose that C ⊆ L0(RN ) is a convex set such 0 ∈C and
C + RN+ ∈ C. Assume in addition that π : C → R satisfies π(u) = 1 for a
given u ∈ RN+ , u 6= 0, and
π(α1Y1 + α2Y2) = α1π(Y1) + α2π(Y2)
for all αi ∈ R+ and Yi ∈ C. Let
AY :=
{
Z ∈ L0(RN ) | Λ(Z,Y) ∈ Bpi(Y)
}
,
where Λ is concave and Λ(X, ·) : C → L0(R) is increasing (with respect to
the componentwise ordering) for all X ∈ L0(RN ). Then the family of sets
AY fulfill properties (P1) and (P2). The map ρ defined in (2.1) is given by
ρ(X) = inf{π(Y) ∈ R | Y ∈ C, Λ(X,Y) ∈ Bpi(Y)} (3.7)
and is a quasi-convex systemic risk measure.
Proof. Property (P1): it follows immediately from the monotonicity of Bx,
x ∈ R.
Property (P2): Let Y1,Y2 ∈ C, m ∈ R and assume w.l.o.g. that π(Y1) ≤
π(Y2) ≤ m. Let X1 ∈ AY1 , X2 ∈ AY2 and λ ∈ [0, 1]. Then Λ(X1,Y1) ∈
Bpi(Y1) and Λ(X2,Y2) ∈ Bpi(Y2). Because (Bx)x∈R is increasing, we get
Λ(X1,Y1) ∈ Bpi(Y2). Set
Yˆ1 := Y1 + (π(Y2)− π(Y1))u ∈ C.
Then Yˆ1 ≥ Y1 and, since Λ(X, ·) is increasing, Λ(X1, Yˆ1) ≥ Λ(X1,Y1) ∈Bpi(Y2)
and
Λ(X1, Yˆ1) ∈ Bpi(Y2)
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because of the monotonicity of Bpi(Y2). Letting
Y := λYˆ1 + (1− λ)Y2 ∈ C ,
and using the properties of π we obtain:
π(Y) = π(λ[Y1 + (π(Y2)− π(Y1))u] + (1− λ)Y2)
= λπ(Y1 + (π(Y2)− π(Y1))u) + (1− λ)π(Y2) = π(Y2) ≤ m.
From the concavity of Λ(·, ·) and the convexity of Bpi(Y2) we obtain:
Λ(λX1+(1− λ)X2,Y) = Λ(λX1+(1− λ)X2, λYˆ1 + (1− λ)Y2)
= Λ(λ(X1, Yˆ1) + (1− λ)(X2,Y2))
≥ λΛ(X1, Yˆ1) + (1− λ)Λ(X2,Y2)
∈ Bpi(Y2) = Bpi(Y),
and the monotonicity of Bpi(Y) implies:
Λ(λX1+(1− λ)X2,Y) ∈ Bpi(Y),
which means: λX1+(1− λ)X2 ∈ AY. Hence, property (P2) is satisfied.
4 Scenario-dependent Allocations
We will now focus on the particularly interesting family of sets C of risk level
vectors Y defined by
C ⊆ {Y ∈ L0(RN ) |
N∑
n=1
Y n ∈ R} =: CR. (4.1)
A vector Y ∈ C as in (4.1) can be interpreted as cash amount∑Nn=1 Y n ∈ R
(which is known today because it is deterministic) that at the future time
horizon T is allocated to the financial institutions according to the realized
scenario. That is, for i = 1, ..., N , Y i(ω) is allocated to institution i in
case scenario ω has been realized at T , but the total allocated cash amount∑N
n=1 Y
n stays constant over the different scenarios. One could think of
a lender of last resort or a regulator who at time T has a certain amount
of cash at disposal to distribute among financial institutions in the most
efficient way (with respect to systemic risk) according to the scenario that
has been realized. Restrictions on the admissible distributions of cash are
implied by the choice of set C. For example, choosing C = RN corresponds
to the fact that the distribution is deterministic, i.e. the allocation to each
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institution is already determined today, whereas for C = CR the distribution
can be chosen completely freely depending on the scenario ω that has been
realized. Note that the latter case includes potential negative cash alloca-
tions, i.e. withdrawals of cash from certain components which allows for
cross-subsidization between financial institutions. The (more realistic) situ-
ation of scenario-dependent cash distribution without cross-subsidization is
represented by the set
C := {Y ∈ CR | Y i ≥ 0, i = 1, ...N}.
In this section we give some structural results and examples concerning
systemic risk measures defined in terms of sets C as in (4.1). In Section 5
and 6 we then present two more extensive examples of systemic risk measures
that employ specific sets C of type (4.1).
In the following we always assume the componentwise order relation on
L0(RN ), i.e. X1  X2 if Xi1 ≥ Xi2 for all components i = 1, ..., N , and we
start by specifying a general class of quasi-convex systemic risk measures
that allow the interpretation of the minimal total amount needed to secure
the system by scenario-dependent cash allocations as described above. To
this end let C ⊆ CR be such that
C + RN+ ∈ C. (4.2)
Let the valuation π(Y) of a Y ∈ C be given by π˜(∑Nn=1 Y n) for π˜ : R → R
increasing (for example the present value of the total cash amount
∑N
n=1 Y
n
at time T ). Further, let (Ax)x∈R be an increasing family (w.r.t. x) of
monotone, convex subsets Ax ⊆ L0(RN), and let θ : R→ R be an increasing
function. We can then define the following family of systemic risk measures
ρ(X) := inf{π(Y) ∈ R | Y ∈ C, X+Y ∈ Aθ(
∑
Y n)} , (4.3)
i.e. the risk measure can be interpreted as the valuation of the minimal total
amount needed at time T to secure the system by distributing the cash in the
most effective way among institutions. Note that here the criteria whether a
system is safe or not after injecting a vector Y is given by the acceptance set
Aθ(
∑
Y n) which itself depends on the total amount
∑N
n=1 Y
n. This gives, for
example, the possibility of modeling an increasing level of prudence when
defining safe systems for higher amounts of the required total cash. This
effect will lead to truly quasi-convex systemic risk measures as the next
proposition shows:
Proposition 4.1 The family of sets
AY := Aθ(
∑
Y n) −Y, Y ∈ C,
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fulfills properties (P1) and (P2) with respect to the componentwise order
relation on L0(RN ). Hence the map (4.3) is a quasi-convex risk measure. If
further π˜ is convex and θ is constant then the map (4.3) is even a convex
risk measure.
Proof. Property (P1) follows immediately from the monotonicity of Ax, x ∈
R. To show Property (P2) let Y1,Y2 ∈ C, m ∈ R, and π˜(
∑N
n=1 Y
n
1 ) ≤
π˜(
∑N
n=1 Y
n
2 ) ≤ m, where w.l.o.g.
∑
Y n1 ≤
∑
Y n2 . Further, let X1 ∈ AY1 ,
X2 ∈ AY2 and λ ∈ [0, 1]. Because (Ax)x∈R and θ are increasing we get
X1 +Y1 ∈ Aθ(
∑
Y n2 ). Set
Yˆ1 := Y1 + (
∑
Y n2 −
∑
Y n1 , 0, ..., 0) ∈ C .
Then
X1 + Yˆ1 ∈ Aθ(
∑
Y n2 )
because of the monotonicity of Aθ(
∑
Y n2 ), and
λ(X1 + Yˆ1) + (1− λ)(X2 +Y2) ∈ Aθ(
∑
Y n2 )
because of the convexity of Aθ(
∑
Y n2 ). Furthermore, with
Y := λYˆ1 + (1− λ)Y2 ,
we get λX1 + (1 − λ)X2 ∈ AY and π(Y) = π(Y2) ≤ m since
∑N
n=1 Y
n =∑N
n=1 Y
n
2 . Hence, property (P2) is satisfied. The final statement follows
from Frittelli and Scandolo [2006].
Note that the quasi-convex risk measures in (4.3) are obtained in a similar
way as the ones in (3.6), the main difference being that the risk measures
in (3.6) are defined on an aggregated level in terms of one-dimensional ac-
ceptance sets while the ones in (4.3) are defined in terms of general multi-
dimensional acceptance sets. However, in the case C = CR the next propo-
sition shows that every systemic risk measure of type (4.3) can be written
as a univariate quasi-convex risk measure applied to the sum of the risk
factors. That is, when free scenario-dependent allocations with unlimited
cross-subsidization between the financial institutions are possible, the sum
as aggregation rule might not only be acceptable as mentioned in the in-
troduction but is the canonical way of aggregation and the canonical way
of measuring systemic risk is of type (1.4). However, while this situation
and insight is relevant for a portfolio manager, the typical financial systems
does not allow for unlimited cross-subsidization and more restricted sets C
together with more appropriate aggregation rules have to be considered.
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Proposition 4.2 Let C = CR. Then ρ in (4.3) is of the form
ρ(X) = ρ˜(
N∑
n=1
Xn) (4.4)
for some quasi-convex risk measure
ρ˜ : L0(R)→ R := R ∪ {−∞} ∪ {∞} .
Proof. Let X1,X1 ∈ L0(RN ) be such that
∑N
n=1X
n
1 =
∑N
n=1X
n
2 . In the
notation of the proof of Lemma 2.3, let Y1 ∈ B(X1) and set
Y2 := Y1 + (X1 −X2) ∈ C .
Then X1 +Y1 = X2 +Y2, and thus Y2 ∈ B(X2) because
∑
Y n1 =
∑
Y n2
which implies Aθ(
∑
Y n1 ) = Aθ(
∑
Y n2 ). Since π(Y1) = π(Y2) this implies
ρ(X1) ≥ ρ(X2). Interchanging the roles of X1 and X2 yields ρ(X1) =
ρ(X2), and the map ρ˜ : L0(R)→ R given by
ρ˜(X) := ρ(X) ,
where X ∈ L0(RN) is such that X =∑Nn=1Xn is well-defined. For X1,X2 ∈
L0(R) define
Xi := (Xi, 0, ..., 0) ∈ L0(RN) , i = 1, 2 .
Then
ρ˜(λX1 + (1− λ)X2) = ρ(λX1 + (1− λ)X2) ≤ max{ρ(X1), ρ(X2)}
= max{ρ˜(X1), ρ˜(X2)} .
Further, if X1 ≤ X2 then X1 ≤ X2 and
ρ˜(X1) = ρ(X1) ≥ ρ(X2) = ρ˜(X2) .
So ρ˜ : L0(R)→ R is a quasi-convex risk measure and ρ(X) = ρ˜(∑Nn=1Xn).
We conclude this Section by two examples that compare the risk measure-
ment by “injecting after aggregation”as in (1.5) versus the risk measurement
by “injecting before aggregation”as in (1.9) for different sets C ⊂ CR in the
situation of the worst case and the expected shortfall acceptance sets, re-
spectively.
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4.1 Example: Worst Case Acceptance Set
In this example we measure systemic risk by considering aggregated risk
factors defined in terms of the aggregation rule
Λ(X) :=
N∑
i=1
−(Xi)−.
Further, we consider the acceptance set AW associated to the worst case risk
measure, that is a system X is acceptable (or safe) if
∑N
i=1−(Xi)− ∈ AW
where AW := L0+(R), and we denote by ρW : L0(R) → R the univariate
worst case risk measure defined by
ρW (X) := inf
{
m ∈ R | X +m ∈ AW} .
The possible sets C are on one hand the deterministic allocations C = RN
and on the other hand the family of constrained scenario-dependent cash
allocations of the form
Cγ := {Y ∈ CR | Yi ≥ γi , i = 1, ...N} ,
where γ := (γ1, ..., γN ), γi ∈ [−∞, 0]. Note that for γ := (−∞, ...,−∞) this
family of subsets includes C∞ = CR. Finally, we let the valuation be
π(Y) :=
n∑
i=1
Yi.
The objective of the following proposition is to analyze and relate the sys-
temic risk measurement by “injecting cash after aggregation”:
ρag(X) := inf
{
y ∈ R | Λ(X) + y ∈ AW} = ρW ( N∑
i=1
−(Xi)−) ,
to the systemic risk measurement by “injecting cash before aggregation”,
both in the case of deterministic cash allocations:
ρR
N
(X) := inf
{
π(Y)| Y ∈ RN ,Λ(X+Y) ∈ AW} ,
as well as in the case of scenario-dependent cash allocations:
ργ(X) := inf
{
π(Y)| Y ∈ Cγ ,Λ(X+Y) ∈ AW
}
.
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Proposition 4.3 It holds that
ρR
N
(X) =
N∑
i=1
ρW (X
i) ≥ ρag(X)
ργ(X) = ρW
(
N∑
i=1
(XiI{Xi≤−γi} − γiI{Xi≥−γi})
)
≤ ρag(X) .
In particular, for γ = 0 := (0, ..., 0) we get ρ0(X) = ρag(X), and for γ =
−∞ := (−∞, ...,−∞) we get ρ−∞(X) = ρW (
∑N
i=1X
i).
Before we prove the proposition we make some comments on the results.
We see that if we interpret the risk measure as capital requirement (which
in this situation also is possible for ρag since the aggregation Λ(X) can be
interpreted as a monetary amount), the capital requirement when “inject-
ing before aggregation”with deterministic allocations is higher than the one
when “injecting after aggregation”. When allowing for “injecting before ag-
gregation”with scenario-dependent cash allocations, the gained flexibility in
allocating the cash leads to decreasing capital requirements. For fully flexi-
ble allocations the minimum amount ρ−∞(X) = ρW (
∑N
i=1X
i) is obtained,
which corresponds to the representation given in Proposition 4.2 in terms
of the sum as aggregation rule. Obviously, here the relations between ρag,
ρR
N
, and ργ depend on the choice of the acceptance set in conjunction with
the aggregation function as is illustrated in the next example.
Further, from the proof below it follows that in the case C = RN there
exists a unique allocation Y∗ ∈ RN for a given X ∈ L0(RN ) such that
ρR
N
(X) = π(Y∗), which implies an unambiguous ranking of the systemic
riskiness of the institutions. On the other hand, in the case C = Cγ there
generically exist infinitely many scenario-dependent allocations Y∗ ∈ Cγ for
a given X ∈ L0(RN ) for which the infimum of the risk measure ργ(X) =
π(Y∗) is obtained. In that case one needs to discuss further how to pick an
allocation and to establish a ranking of systemic riskiness of the institutions.
Proof. Note that for X ∈ L0(RN ) it holds that Λ(X) ∈ AW iff Xi ∈
A
W , i = 1, ..., N . Thus we can rewrite
ρR
N
(X) := inf
{
N∑
i=1
Y i|Y ∈ RN ,X+Y ∈ (AW )N
}
,
and obviously get
ρR
N
(X) =
N∑
i=1
−ess.inf(Xi) =
N∑
i=1
ρW (X
i),
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and for X ∈ L0(RN ) the allocation Yˆ := (ess.inf(X1), ..., ess.inf(XN )) is the
unique Yˆ ∈ RN such that ρRN (X) = π(Yˆ).
For ργ we analogously rewrite
ργ(X) := inf
{
N∑
i=1
Y i|Y ∈ Cγ ,X+Y ∈ (AW )N
}
.
Now consider first the optimization problem
ρ˜(X) := inf
{
ess.sup(
N∑
i=1
Y i)|Y ∈ L0(RN ), Y i ≥ γi ,X+Y ∈ (AW )N
}
.
(4.5)
Then clearly ρ˜ ≤ ργ and Y∗ := −(XiI{Xi≤−γi} − γiI{Xi≥−γi})i=1,...N is an
optimal solution of (4.5). Now define
Y˜ := Y∗ + (ess.sup(
N∑
i=1
Y ∗i )−
N∑
i=1
Y ∗i , 0, ..., 0).
Then Y˜ ∈ Cγ and ργ(X) ≤ π(Y˜) = ess.sup(
∑N
i=1 Y
∗
i ) = ρ˜(X) ≤ ργ(X), and
thus
ργ(X) =
N∑
i=1
Y˜i = ess.sup
(
N∑
i=1
Y ∗i
)
= ess.sup
(
N∑
i=1
−(XiI{Xi≤−γi} − γiI{Xi≥−γi})
)
.
Finally we remark that generically for a given X ∈ L0(RN ) the above allo-
cation Y˜ ∈ Cγ is not unique such that ργ(X) = π(Y˜). In fact, any allocation
of the form
Y∗ + (Z1, ..., ZN )
with (Z1, ..., ZN ) ∈ L0(RN ) such that
∑N
i=1 Zi = ess.sup(
∑N
i=1 Y
∗
i )−
∑N
i=1 Y
∗
i
will satisfy the desired property.
4.2 Example: Expected Shortfall Acceptance Set
Now consider the acceptance set associated to the “Expected Shortfall”risk
measure ρES (at some given quantile level):
A
ES := {X ∈ L0(R) | ρES(X) ≤ 0}.
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See e.g. Fo¨llmer and Schied [2004] for the definition of ρES. Everything else
is assumed to be as in Example 4.1. Then
ρag(X) = ρES(
N∑
i=1
−(Xi)−) .
For ρR
N
and ργ , however, AES gives the same result as AW , i.e.
ρR
N
(X) =
N∑
i=1
ρW (X
i) ≥ ρag(X) (4.6)
ργ(X) = ρW
(
N∑
i=1
(XiI{Xi≤−γi} − γiI{Xi≥−γi})
)
. (4.7)
Indeed, by the definition of ρES it immediatly follows that
∑N
i=1−(Xi)− ∈
A
ES if and only if Xi ∈ AW , i = 1, ..., N , and (4.6) and (4.7) is then ob-
tained from Proposition 4.3. So opposite to the situation in Example 4.1,
here the risk measure when “injecting before aggregation”even with scenario-
dependent allocations might be higher than the one when “injecting after
aggregation”. Indeed, we easily see that we always have ρ0 ≥ ρag, and gener-
ically even ρ−∞ ≥ ρag holds. This illustrates that these kind of relations
highly depends on the interplay between aggregation and acceptance set.
5 Gaussian Systems
In this Section we assume a Gaussian financial system, i.e. we let X =
(X1, · · · ,XN ) be anN -dimensional Gaussian random vector with covariance
matrix Q, where [Q]ii := σ
2
i , i = 1, · · · , N , and [Q]ij := ρi,j for i 6= j,
i, j = 1, · · · , N , and mean vector µ := (µ1, · · · , µN ), i.e. X ∼ N(µ,Q). The
systemic risk measure we consider is given by
ρ(X) := inf
{
N∑
i=1
Y i | Y ∈ C ⊆ CR , Λ(X+Y) ∈ Aγ
}
, (5.1)
where the set CR of scenario-dependent cash allocations is defined in (4.1),
the aggregation rule is given by Λ(X) :=
∑N
i=1−(Xi − di)− for di ∈ R, and
the acceptance set is
Aγ :=
{
Z ∈ L0(R) | E [Z] ≥ −γ} (5.2)
for some γ ∈ R+. Here, di in the aggregation rule denotes some critical
liquidity level of institution i, i = 1, ...N , and the risk measure is concerned
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with the expected total shortfall below these levels in the system. In Sub-
section 5.1 we compute the allocation and the systemic risk measure in case
of deterministic cash allocations C := RN, and in Subsection 5.2 we allow
for more flexible scenario-dependent allocations of the form
C :=
{
Y ∈ L0(Rn) | Y =m+ αID, m, α ∈ RN ,
N∑
i=1
αi = 0
}
⊆ CR, (5.3)
where ID is the indicator function of the event D :=
{∑N
i=1X
i ≤ d
}
for
some d ∈ R. Note that the condition ∑Ni=1 αi = 0 implies that ∑Ni=1 Y i is
constant a.s. Cash allocations in (5.3) can be interpreted as the flexibility
to let the allocation depend on whether the system at time T is in trouble
or not, represented by the events that
∑N
i=1X
i is less or greater than some
critical level d, respectively. In Subsection 5.3 we then apply the results to
a Gaussian system that is interconnected by the flow of capital between the
institutions through a system of interacting Ornstein-Uhlenbeck diffusions.
5.1 Deterministic Cash Allocations
We now consider the case C = RN and we are interested in computing the
systemic risk measure
ρ(X) := inf
{
N∑
i=1
mi | m = (m1, · · · ,mN ) ∈ RN , Λ(X+m) ∈ Aγ
}
,
(5.4)
where for notational clarity we write m instead of Y for deterministic cash
allocations. We thus need to minimize the objective function
∑N
i=1mi over
R
N under the constrained Λ(X+m) ∈ Aγ , which clearly is equivalent to the
constraint
N∑
i=1
E
[
(Xi +mi − di)−
]
= γ . (5.5)
This constrained optimization problem can be solved with the associated
Lagrangian
L(m1, ...,mN , λ) :=
N∑
i=1
mi + λ(
N∑
i=1
ψi(mi)− γ) (5.6)
where ψi(mi) := E
[
(Xi +mi − di)−
]
. Since Xi ∼ N(µi, σ2i ), one obtains
for i = 1, ..., N that
ψi(mi) =
σi√
2π
exp
[
−(di − µi −mi)
2
2σ2i
]
− (mi + µi − di)Φ(di − µi −mi
σi
),
(5.7)
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where Φ(x) =
∫ x
+∞
1√
2pi
e−t2/2dt. By direct computation this leads to
∂L(m1, ...,mN , λ)
∂mi
= 1 + λΦ(
di − µi −mi
σi
). (5.8)
By solving the Lagrangian system we then obtain the critical point m∗ =
(m∗1, · · · ,m∗N ) given by
m∗i = di − µi − σiR,
where R solves the equation
P (R) := RΦ(R) +
1√
2π
exp
[
−R
2
2
]
=
γ∑N
i=1 σi
. (5.9)
It is easily verified thatm∗ is indeed a global minimum and thus the optimal
cash allocation associated with the risk measure (5.4). The unique optimal
cash allocation m∗ now also induces a ranking of the institutions according
to systemic riskiness, and we can discuss the dependence of this ranking
with respect to µi and σi:
1. ∂mi∂µi = −1: the systemic riskiness decreases with increasing mean.
2. ∂mi∂σi > 0: the systemic riskiness increases with increasing volatility. In
order to show ∂mi∂σi > 0 we first note that R is a solution of (5.9) if and
only if R is negative. Indeed, for R ≥ 0 the left-hand side of (5.9) is
always strictly positive, the right-hand side is negative. Thus
∂mi
∂σi
= −R− σi ∂R
∂σi
. (5.10)
By differentiating (5.9) we obtain
∂P
∂σi
=
∂P
∂R
∂R
∂σi
= − γ
(
∑N
k=1 σk)
2
. (5.11)
Since ∂P∂R = Φ(R), we can compute
∂R
∂σi
and substitute it in (5.10):
∂mi
∂σi
= −R+ σiγ
(
∑N
k=1 σk)
2
1
Φ(R)
= −R+ σi(
∑N
k=1 σk)P (R)
(
∑N
k=1 σk)
2Φ(R)
= −R+
σi(RΦ(R) +
1√
2pi
exp
[
−R22
]
)
(
∑N
k=1 σk)Φ(R)
= (
σi∑N
k=1 σk
− 1)R + σi∑N
k=1 σk
1√
2πΦ(R)
exp
[
−R
2
2
]
.
Since R must be negative, this implies ∂mi∂σi > 0.
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5.2 A Class of Scenario-Dependent Allocations
We now allow for different allocations of the total capital at disposal de-
pending on which state the system is in. More precisely, we differentiate
between the two states that D := {S ≤ d} and Dc = {S > d} for some
level d ∈ R and S := ∑Ni=1Xi, and consider allocations C given in (5.3).
The systemic risk measure now becomes
ρ(X) := inf
{
N∑
i=1
mi| m+ αID ∈ C , Λ(X+m+ αID) ∈ Aγ
}
.
To compute the risk measure in this case we now need to minimize the
objective function
∑N
i=1mi over (m, α) ∈ R2N under the constraints
N∑
i=1
αi = 0 and
N∑
i=1
E
[
(Xi +mi + αiID − di)−
]
= γ .
In analogy to the Section 5.2 we apply the method of Lagrange multipliers
to minimize the function
φ(m1, · · · ,mN , α1, · · · , αN−1, λ) =
N∑
i=1
mi + λ (Ψ(m1, · · · ,mN , α1, · · · , αN−1)− γ) , (5.12)
where
Ψ(m1, · · · ,mN , α1, · · · , αN−1) :=
N−1∑
i=1
E
[
(Xi +mi + αiID − di)−
]
+ E
(XN +mN − N−1∑
j=1
αjID − dN )−
 ,
as follows.
1. By computing the derivatives with respect to αi, i = 1, · · · , N − 1:
∂φ
∂αi
= 0 if and only if
Fi,S(di −mi − αi, d) = FN,S(dN −mN +
N−1∑
j=1
αj , d) (5.13)
for i = 1, · · · , N − 1, where Fi,S and FN,S are the joint distribution
functions of (Xi, S) and (XN , S) respectively.
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2. By computing the derivatives with respect to mi, for i = 1, · · · , N − 1:
∂φ
∂mi
= 0 if and only if
Φ(
di − µi −mi
σi
) + Fi,S(di −mi, d) =
Φ(
dN − µn −mN
σn
) + FN,S(dN −mN , d), (5.14)
for i = 1, · · · , N − 1.
3. By computing the derivatives with respect to λ: ∂φ∂λ = 0 if and only if
Ψ(m1, · · · ,mN , α1, · · · , αN−1) = γ, where
Ψ(m1, · · · ,mN , α1, · · · , αN−1) =
N∑
i=1
ψi(mi)
+
N−1∑
i=1
[(mi − di)FN,S(di −mi, d)− (mi + αi − di)Fi,S(di −mi − αi, d)
+
∫ di−mi
di−mi−αi
∫ d
−∞
xFi,S(x, y)dydx
]
+ (mN − dN )FN,S(dN −mN , d)
− (mN −
N−1∑
j=1
αj − dN )FN,S(dN −mN +
N−1∑
j=1
αj , d)
+
∫ dN−mN
dN−mN+
∑N−1
j=1 αj
∫ d
−∞
xFN,S(x, y)dydx,
where ψi, i = 1, · · · , N , are defined in (5.7).
From (5.12) and (5.13) we immediately obtain that if the Xi, i = 1, · · · , N ,
are identically distributed, then the optimal solution is obtained for αi = 0,
i = 1, · · · , N , and corresponds to the one obtained explicitly in Section 5.1
for deterministic injections.
We now present numerical illustrations of our results in the simple case with
two banks.
In Table 1 we set the means µi = 0 for i = 1, 2, the standard deviations
σ1 = 1, σ2 = 3, the acceptance level γ = 0.7 and the critical level d = 2.
The last 2 columns show the sensitivities with respect to the correlation
for deterministic allocation (case α = 0, computed in Section 5.1) and for
scenario-dependent allocation, respectively. We observe that for highly pos-
itively correlated banks the scenario-dependent allocation does not change
the total capital requirement m1 + m2. Indeed, as expected, if the banks
are moving together, one may have to subsidize both of them. However,
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ρ1,2 ↓ Deterministic Random
m1 0.5772 0.1597
m2 1.7316 1.7230
-0.8 α 0 2.8704
ρ = m1 +m2 2.3088 1.8827
m1 0.5772 0.2908
m2 1.7316 1.7776
-0.5 α 0 2.3161
ρ = m1 +m2 2.3088 2.0683
m1 0.5772 0.4490
m2 1.7316 1.7796
0 α 0 1.7208
ρ = m1 +m2 2.3088 2.2286
m1 0.5772 0.5463
m2 1.7316 1.7461
0.5 α 0 1.3389
ρ = m1 +m2 2.3088 2.2924
m1 0.5772 0.5737
m2 1.7316 1.7314
0.8 α 0 0.7905
ρ = m1 +m2 2.3088 2.3053
Table 1: Sensitivity with respect to correlation.
when they are negatively correlated, one benefits from scenario-dependent
allocation since the total allocation m1 +m2 is lower in that case.
In Table 2 we set the means µi = 0 for i = 1, 2, the correlation ρ = −0.5,
the standard deviation σ1 = 1, the acceptance level γ = 0.7 and the critical
level d = 2 and we show sensitivity with respect to the standard deviation
σ2 of the second bank. We observe that for equal marginals (σ1 = σ2 = 1)
random allocation does not change the total capital requirement, as already
stated in Section 5.2. As σ2 increases, the systemic risk measure increases
and the allocation increases with increasing standard deviation in agreement
with the sensitivity analysis presented in Section 5.1 for the deterministic
case. Also we observe that scenario-dependent allocation allows for smaller
total capital requirement m1 +m2.
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σ2 ↓ Deterministic Random
m1 0.1008 0.1008
m2 0.1031 0.1031
1 α 0 0.0002
ρ = m1 +m2 0.2039 0.2039
m1 0.8168 0.3167
m2 4.0816 4.1295
5 α 0 3.5987
ρ = m1 +m2 4.8984 4.4462
m1 1.1417 0.4631
m2 11.3964 11.4333
10 α 0 6.9909
ρ = m1 +m2 12.5381 11.8963
Table 2: Sensitivity with respect to standard deviation.
5.3 Application to Models of Borrowing and Lending
We consider the Gaussian vector Xt = (X
i
t , i = 1, · · · , n) generated by the
following dynamics
dXit =
 N∑
j=1
pi,j(X
j
t −Xit)
 dt+ σi(ρidW 0t +√1− ρ2i dW it) , i = 1, · · · , N,
(5.15)
where
(
W 0t ,W
i
t , i = 1, · · · , N
)
are independent standard Brownian motions
and W 0t is a common noise. The lending-borrowing preferences pi,j are
nonnegative and symmetric: pi,j = pj,i. This model is studied in detail
in Carmona et al. [2015] in the mean-field context where pi,j = p/N with
p ≥ 0. It is shown that in that case the dynamics (5.15) emerges as a Nash
equilibrium of a specific stochastic game.
The total “capitalization”is given by:
N∑
i=1
Xit =
N∑
i=1
xi0 +
(
N∑
i=1
σiρi
)
W 0t +
N∑
i=1
σi
√
1− ρ2iW it
D
=
N∑
i=1
xi0 + αBt,
where Bt is a standard Brownian motion and
α2 =
(
N∑
i=1
σiρi
)2
+
N∑
i=1
(σi)2(1− ρ2i ).
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We are interested in the system at a given time t > 0 and in quantities
such as the liquidity available at time t defined by
∑N
i=1(X
i
t − di)+, or the
shortfall −∑Ni=1(Xit − di)−.
The class C of random vectors Y is for instance chosen as Y = wY
where wi’s are weights, and Y = Yt is defined by
Yt = y0 + s
(
ρ0W
0
t +
√
1− ρ20Wt
)
,
and Wt is a Brownian motion independent of W
0
t . This reflects that the
money which can be allocated to banks can be correlated to the common
factor driving the system. In fact the choice of Wt is general ranging from
a linear combination of the W i’s to being independent of the W i’s. This
situation corresponds to using securities (in this case bonds) as allocation
at the future time t. To keep the example simple we consider the case with
s = 0, that is Yt = y0, and constant injection as we did in Section 5.1.
5.3.1 Homogeneous Network
Here we consider the fully homogeneous case where xi0 = x0, pi,j = p/N ,
σi = σ, ρi = ρ, di = d, so that the model becomes
dXit =
 p
N
N∑
j=1
(Xjt −Xit)
 dt+ σ (ρdW 0t +√1− ρ2dW it) , i = 1, · · · , N,
or
dXit = p
[
X¯t −Xit
]
dt+ σ
(
ρdW 0t +
√
1− ρ2dW it
)
, i = 1, · · · , N, (5.16)
where
X¯t =
1
N
N∑
j=1
Xjt .
In order to apply the results from Section 5.1, we will need to compute the
distribution of a single Xit . The joint distribution of the X
i
t ’s being obviously
Gaussian, Xit is Gaussian with mean µi and variance σ
2
i in the notation of
Section 5.1. A straightforward computation from (5.16) gives:
µi = E(X
i
t) = x0,
and
σ2i = σ
2(1− ρ2)(1− 1
N
)
(
1− e−2pt
2p
)
+ σ2
(
ρ2 +
1− ρ2
N
)
t. (5.17)
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Note that, even though we only consider marginal distributions in the sys-
temic risk measure proposed in Section 5.1, these marginal distributions
depend on the coupled dynamics of the Xi, in particular on the parameters
p and ρ. For instance, one sees that increasing p, that is increasing liquid-
ity, would decrease σ2i (from σ
2t for p = 0 to σ2
(
ρ2 + 1−ρ
2
N
)
t for p = ∞),
and therefore, would decrease systemic risk according with our findings in
Section 5.1.
5.3.2 Central Clearing Network
Here we consider a centralized model where bank 1 (for instance) plays a
clearing role and is related to each of the other banks which are not directly
related to each other. That is pi,j = p if i = 1 or j = 1, and pi,j = 0 if i 6= 1
and j 6= 1; xi0 = x0 if i 6= 1; σi = σ if i 6= 1; ρi = ρ if i 6= 1; di = d if i 6= 1.
The model becomes
dX1t = p
N∑
j=2
(Xjt −X1t )dt+ σc
(
ρcdW
0
t +
√
1− ρ2cdW 1t
)
,
dXit = p(X
1
t −Xit)dt+ σ
(
ρdW 0t +
√
1− ρ2dW it
)
, i = 2, · · · , N,
with initial conditions X10 = x
1
0 and X
i
0 = x0 for i = 2, · · · , N . The joint
distribution of the Xit ’s is again Gaussian. Choosing x
1
0 = x0 = c0/N , we
get
µi = E(X
i
t) = E(X
1
t ) = c0/N.
We turn now to the computation of the variances. Applying Itoˆ’s formula
we get:
dE[(Xit)
2] = 2p
(
E(XitX
1
t )− E[(Xit)2]
)
dt+ σ2dt, i = 2, · · · , N,
dE[(X1t )
2] = 2p
N∑
j=2
(
E(X1tX
j
t )− E[(X1t )2]
)
dt+ σ21dt,
dE(XitX
1
t ) = p
N∑
j=2
(
E(XitX
j
t )− E(XitX1t )
)
dt
+ p
(
E[(X1t )
2]− E(XitX1t )
)
dt+ σσcρρcdt, i = 2, · · · , N,
dE(XitX
j
t ) = p
(
E(X1tX
j
t )− E(XitXjt )
)
dt+ p
(
E(X1tX
i
t)− E(XitXjt )
)
dt
+ σ2ρ2dt, i ≥ 2, j ≥ 2, i 6= j.
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By symmetry among the Xi’s for i ≥ 2, we deduce that E[(Xit)2],E(XitX1t ),
and E(XitX
j
t ) do not depend on i ≥ 2, j ≥ 2. Accordingly, we define:
E[(Xit)
2] = v(t), i ≥ 2,
E(XitX
1
t ) = w(t), i ≥ 2,
E(XitX
j
t ) = χ(t), i ≥ 2, j ≥ 2, i 6= j,
E[(X1t )
2] = v1(t).
These functions satisfies the differential system Y ′ = pAY +B with:
Y =

v
v1
w
χ
 , A =

−2 0 2 0
0 −2(N − 1) 2(N − 1) 0
1 1 −N N − 2
0 0 2 −2
 , B =

σ2
σ2c
σσcρρc
σ2ρ2
 .
We are interested in v(t) and v1(t). Note that by subtracting x
2
0 to these
four functions it is enough to solve the system with zero initial conditions.
A straightforward but tedious computation shows that:
σ21 = v1(t) = var(X
1
t ) = σ
2ρ2t
+
1
N
[
(σ2 + 2σσcρρc − 3σ2ρ2)t+ 2
p
(σ2c − σσcρρc)
]
+O( 1
N2
),
and
σ2i = v(t) = var(X
i
t) = σ
2(1− ρ2)
(
1− e−2pt
2p
)
+ σ2ρ2t
+
1
N
[
(σ2 + 2σσcρρc − 3σ2ρ2)t− σ2(1− ρ2)
(
1− e−2pt
2p
)]
+O( 1
N2
),
to be compared with the exact formula (5.17) in order to compare the sys-
temic risk for a fully connected homogenous network with a central clearing
network. At order one in 1/N , the variance is the same but they may differ
at order 1/N . Writing σ2+2σσcρρc− 3σ2ρ2 = σ2(1− ρ2)+ 2σρ(σcρc−σρ),
we see that the sign of σcρc − σρ determines which network is most stable,
that is the one with smaller variance according to the conclusion in Section
5.1.
5.3.3 Heterogeneous Networks
In practical situations, the network will be heterogeneous described by a
system like our simplified Gaussian model (5.15). The joint distribution
will be fully characterized by the means µi’s and by the covariance matrix
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Q = [cov(Xit ,X
j
t )] which will depend on the parameters of the model, in
particular the preferences pi,j and the individual σ
i. In that case, for given
coefficients and initial conditions, one will be able to numerically compute
the marginal means and variances needed in our systemic risk measures.
Doing so, one will obtain the optimal allocation m = (mi)i=1,··· ,N and a
ranking of the banks with respect to their systemic risk contributions.
5.3.4 An Example with Random Injections
In order to illustrate the results from Section 5.2, we consider a system of
three banks. If it is fully connected and homogenous as in Section 5.3.1,
then in the context of random injections in Section 5.2, by symmetry, the
optimal mi’s will be equal, the αi’s will also be equal and therefore αi = 0
because of the constraint
∑
αi = 0. Consequently, the injection will simply
be constant as studied in Section 5.3.1.
Now we consider the case a heterogenous network with symmetric prefer-
ences such that p2,3 = p/2 and p1,2 = p1,3 = 0, equal starting points x
i
0 = x0,
equal volatility σi = σ, and correlation to common noise ρ1, ρ2 = ρ3 = ρ.
The vector X = (X1,X2,X3) satisfies
dX1t = σ
(
ρ1dW
0
t +
√
1− ρ21dW 1t
)
,
dX2t =
p
2
(
X3t −X2t
)
dt+ σ
(
ρdW 0t +
√
1− ρ2dW 2t
)
,
dX3t =
p
2
(
X2t −X3t
)
dt+ σ
(
ρdW 0t +
√
1− ρ2
)
dW 2t .
The bankX1 is uncoupled with the symmetric network (X2,X3). A straight-
forward computation shows that the Gaussian pair (X1t ,X
2
t +X
3
t ) (where
we have aggregated X2 and X3) admits the covariance matrix
Q = σ2t
(
1 2ρρ1
2ρρ1 2(1 + ρ
2)
)
.
In the following numerical illustration, we take xi0 = 0, i = 1, 2, 3, σ
2t = 1,
ρ = .8 and we vary ρ1 ∈ {−.5,−.2, 0, .2, .5}. In the notation of Section 5.2,
this translates into σ21 = σ
2t = 1, σ22 = 2σ
2t(1 + ρ2) = 3.28 and varying the
covariance 2ρρ1 ∈ {−.8,−.32, 0, .32, .8}. The results are displayed in Table
3 where we show the values of m1,m2, α, and the value of the systemic risk
measure m1 +m2. In the deterministic column, these values do not change
since they depend only on the marginal distributions and α = 0 since in
that case allocations are deterministic. Then, they can be compared with
the values in the case with random allocations where we see that the gain
is more pronounced for negative correlation.
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2ρρ1 ↓ Deterministic Random
m1 0.3486 0.2671
m2 0.6313 0.6347
-0.8 α 0 2.1413
m1 +m2 0.9799 0.9018
m1 0.3486 0.2799
m2 0.6313 0.6577
-0.32 α 0 1.1161
m1 +m2 0.9799 0.9376
m1 0.3486 0.3062
m2 0.6313 0.6530
0 α 0 0.8416
m1 +m2 0.9799 0.9592
m1 0.3486 0.3271
m2 0.6313 0.6414
0.32 α 0 0.6813
m1 +m2 0.9799 0.9685
m1 0.3486 0.3436
m2 0.6313 0.6294
0.8 α 0 .6597
m1 +m2 0.9799 0.9750
Table 3: Sensitivity with respect to correlation to common noise.
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6 Example: Systems on a Finite Probability Space
We now consider a financial system X = (X1, · · · ,XN ) that is defined on a
finite probability space (Ω,F ,P) with Ω = {ω1, · · · , ωM}, F = 2Ω, P(ωi) =
pi ∈ (0, 1), i = 1, · · · ,M . The systemic risk measure we are interested in
here is given by
ρ(X) := inf
{
N∑
i=1
Y i | Y = (Y 1, · · · , Y N ) ∈ Ch ,Λ(X+Y) ∈ Aγ
}
, (6.1)
where as in Section 5 the acceptance set is Aγ =
{
Z ∈ L0(R)| E[Z] ≥ −γ}
for γ > 0 and the admissible allocations Ch are introduced below. The
aggregation is defined by
Λ(x1, · · · , xN ) :=
N∑
i=1
− exp (−αixi) (6.2)
for αi > 0, i = 1, · · · , N . Compared to the aggregation in Section 5, the
aggregation in (6.2) is more risk averse with respect to bigger losses but also
takes benefits of gains into account.
Due to the finite probability space the computation of the optimal al-
location associated to the risk measure (6.1) reduces to solving a finite-
dimensional system of equations even for most general scenario-dependent
allocation. More precisely, let h := (h1, .., hk) with 0 < h1 < h2 < · · · <
hk−1 < hk = N represent some partition of {1, .., N} for a given k ∈
{1, · · · , N}. We then introduce the following family of allocations:
Ch =
{
Y ∈ L0(RN ) | ∃ d = (d1, · · · , dk) ∈ Rk such that
h1∑
i=1
Y i(wj) = d1,
h2∑
i=h1+1
Y i(wj) = d2, · · · ,
N∑
i=hk−1+1
Y i(wj) = dk, for j = 1, · · · ,M
}
⊆ CR. (6.3)
This corresponds to the situation when the regulator is constrained in the
way that she cannot distribute cash freely among all financial institutions
but only within k subgroups that are induced by the partition h. In other
words, the risk measure is the sum of k minimal cash amounts d1, ..., dk
determined today, that at time T can be freely allocated within the k sub-
groups in order to make the system safe. Note that this family spans from
deterministic allocations C = RN for k = N to CR for k = 1.
For a given partition h of subgroups one can now explicitly compute a
unique optimal allocation Y∗ and the corresponding systemic risk ρ(X) =∑N
i=1 Y
i,∗ in (6.1) by solving the corresponding Lagrangian system. For
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better readability of the text we here state the explicit expressions for the
following subfamily of allocations
Cr =
{
Y ∈ L0(R)N | ∃ (cN , cN−1, · · · , cN−r) ∈ Rr+1 such that
N∑
i=1
Y i(wj) = cN ,
N−1∑
i=1
Y i(wj) = cN−1, · · · ,
N−r∑
i=1
Y i(wj) = cN−r, for j = 1, · · · ,M
}
(6.4)
for 0 ≤ r ≤ N − 1. This class corresponds to r subgroups of size one and
one remaining bigger subgroup of size N − r, and the two extreme cases are
recovered for r = 0 and r = N − 1. Note that the summation over the Y i’s
of the subgroups in (6.4) has been re-parametrized compared to (6.3) for
the sake of more accessible expressions below.
The following are the optimal solutions when computing the systemic risk
measure (6.1) with the set C = Cr of type (6.4). The proof is deferred to the
appendix. For notational simplicity we denote by ykj := Y
k,∗(ωj) for k =
1, · · · , N , j = 1, · · · ,M the optimal allocation. The optimal cN−r, · · · , cN
are given by
cN−r = −βN−r log( γ
α1βNdN−r
), (6.5)
where
βN−r =
N−r∑
i=1
1
αi
and βN =
N∑
i=1
1
αi
,
dN−r =
M∑
j=1
pj exp
[
− 1
βN−r
N−r∑
i=1
Xi(wj)− 1
βN−r
N−r∑
i=1
1
αi
log(
α1
αi
)
]
,
and by
ck = ck−1 − 1
αk
log(
γ
αkβNKk
)
= cN−r −
k∑
j=N−r+1
1
αj
log(
γ
αjβNKj
)
= −βN−r log( γ
α1βNdN−r
)−
k∑
j=N−r+1
1
αj
log(
γ
αjβNKj
) (6.6)
for k = N − r + 1, · · · , N , r ≥ 1, with
Kk =
M∑
j=1
pj exp
(
−αkXk(wj)
)
.
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In particular the optimal cN provides the value of the systemic risk measure,
i.e.
ρ(X) = −βN−r log( γ
α1βNdN−r
)−
N∑
j=N−r+1
1
αj
log(
γ
αjβNKj
). (6.7)
The optimal allocations are given by
y1j =
1
α1βN−r
N−r∑
i=1
Xi(wj)−X1(wj)+ 1
α1βN−r
N−r∑
i=1
1
αi
log(
α1
αi
)+
1
α1βN−r
cN−r
(6.8)
for j = 1, · · · ,M , by
ykj =
1
αk
[
α1X
1(wj)− αkXk(wj)− log(α1
αk
) + α1y
1
j
]
(6.9)
=
1
αkβN−r
N−r∑
i=1
Xi(wj)−Xk(wj)− 1
αk
log(
α1
αk
)
+
1
αkβN−r
N−r∑
i=1
1
αi
log(
α1
αi
) +
1
αkβN−r
cN−r (6.10)
for all k = 2, · · · , N − r − 1 and j ∈ 1, · · · ,M , and by
ykj = ck − ck−1 = −
1
αk
log(
γ
αkβNKk
) (6.11)
for all k = N − r, · · · , N and j ∈ 1, · · · ,M .
Remark 6.1 One could extend the above setting further by adding the pos-
sibility to limit cross-subsidization in the allocations. This can be done by
introducing another constraint into the family (6.3) of cash allocations:
Ch,b =
{
Y ∈ L0(R)N | Y i ≥ bi, i = 1, · · · , N ;
h1∑
i=1
Y i(wj) = d1,
h2∑
i=h1+1
Y i(wj) = d2, · · · ,
N∑
i=hk−1+1
Y i(wj) = dk,
for j = 1, · · · ,M, and dt ∈ R for t = 0, · · · , k
}
⊆ CR,
where (b1, ..., bN ) ∈ RN . For example, putting b := (0, ..., 0) excludes cash
withdrawals from institutions and in this sense doesn’t allow for any cross-
subsidization. The systemic risk measure and corresponding optimal allo-
cations solution can now be computed by resorting to the Karush Kuhn
Tucker conditions (Boyd and Vandenberghe [2009]), see the computations
in Pastore [2014].
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Systemic risk measure Case
−26.36 r = 0
−0.56 r = 2, {X1,X3}
4.44 r = 2, {X2,X3}
63.71 r = 2, {X2,X4}
68.36 r = 2, {X1,X4}
72.96 r = 2, {X3,X4}
74.48 r = 2, {X1,X2}
79.02 r = 3
Table 4: Systemic risk measure.
Example 6.2 We conclude this section with a numerical example. We con-
sider a system of four banks represented by the random variables X1,X2,X3
and X4 on the probability space (Ω,F ,P), where Ω = (ω1, ω2, ω3, ω4), F =
2Ω and P(ω1) = 0.64, P(ω2) = P(ω3) = 0.16 and P(ω4) = 0.04. We assume
that X4 is independent of X1,X2,X3, that X2 is comonotone with X1 and
that X3 is countermonotone with X1. Furthermore X1(w1) = X
1(w3) =
100,X1(w2) = X
1(w4) = −50, X2(w1) = X2(w3) = 50,X2(w2) = X2(w4) =
−25, X3(w1) = X3(w3) = −25,X3(w2) = X3(w4) = 50 and X4(w1) =
X4(w2) = 50,X
4(w3) = X
4(w4) = −25. We set αi = 0.3 for i = 1, · · · , 4
and γ = 50 and consider the set Cr defined in (6.4).
In this setting, Tables 5 and 6 reproduce the deterministic allocations and
optimal scenario-dependent allocations for r = 2 given by (6.8), (6.9) and
(6.11) as well as the systemic risk measure ρ given by (6.7). In Table 4 we
provide the systemic risk measures for all r = 0, 1, 2, 3. From Table 4 we note
that the maximum and minimum value of ρ are obtained respectively in the
deterministic (r = 3) and the fully unconstrained scenario-dependent (r = 0)
cases. Whenever one groups (X1 and X3) or (X2 and X3), ρ is substantially
reduced (−0.56 or 4.44), compared to the deterministic case (79.02), as these
couples of vectors are counter monotone. Whenever one groups X4 with
any of the X1, X2, X3, there is little difference (68.36, 63.71, 72.96) with
respect to the deterministic case (79.02), as X4 is independent from the
others. Grouping X1 and X2 has very little effect (74.48) compared to the
deterministic case (79.02), as X1 and X2 are comonotone.
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Groups: {X1}, {X2}, {X3}, {X4) Deterministic
Y1 36.18
Y2 15.82
Y3 15.82
Y4 11.20
Systemic risk=
∑
Yi 79.02
Table 5: Case r = 3.
A Appendix
A.1 Gaussian Case with Random Injections
We provide here the computations necessary to minimize the function (5.12).
We first consider
E
[
(Xi + Y i − di)−
]
= E
[
(Xi +mi + αiID − di)−
]
= E
[
(Xi +mi + αi − di)−ID
]
+ E
[
(Xi +mi − di)−IAc
]
= E
[{
(Xi +mi + αi − di)− − (Xi +mi − di)−
}
ID
]
+ E
[
(Xi +mi − di)−
]
(A.1)
for i = 1, · · · , N . To compute (A.1), we distinguish between the cases
αi > 0 and αi < 0. Note that by the definition of C, we cannot a pri-
ori argue on the sign of α. For αi > 0, we have that
{
Xi ≤ di −mi
}
={
Xi ≤ di −mi − αi
} ∪ {di −mi − αi < Xi ≤ di −mi}. Here we set A1 :={
Xi ≤ di −mi − αi
}
and A2 :=
{
di −mi − αi < Xi ≤ di −mi
}
. Then
(Xi +mi + αi − di)− − (Xi +mi − di)− = −αiIA1 + (Xi +mi − di)IA2 ,
and
E
[
(Xi + Y i − di)−
]
= −αiE [IA1ID] + E
[
(Xi +mi − di)IA2ID
]
+ E
[
(Xi +mi − di)−
]
= (mi − di)Fi,S(di −mi, d)− (mi + αi − di)Fi,S(di −mi − αi, d)
+
∫ di−mi
di−mi−αi
∫ d
−∞
xfi,S(x, y)dydx + E
[
(Xi +mi − di)−
]
,
where Fi,S and fi,S are the joint distribution function and the density of
(Xi, S), respectively. Recall that in our setting (Xi, S) ∼ N2(µ¯i, Q¯i) with
mean vector µ¯i = (µi,
∑n
j=1 µj) and covariance matrix
Q¯i =
 σ2i σ2i +
∑
j 6=i ρi,j
σ2i +
∑
j 6=i ρi,j
∑n
j=1 σ
2
j +
∑n
j,k=1 ρj,k
 .
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Groups: {X1,X2}, {X3}, {X4) Random Deterministic
Y1(ω1) = Y1(ω3) = 11.27
Y1 Y1(ω2) = Y1(ω4) = 36.23
E[Y1] = 6.23
Y2(ω1) = Y2(ω3) = 48.73
Y2 Y2(ω2) = Y2(ω4) = 11.23
E[Y1] = 41.23 Y1 + Y2 = 47.46
Y3 15.82
Y4 11.20
Systemic risk=
∑
Yi 74.48
Groups: {X1,X3}, {X2}, {X4)
Y1(ω1) = Y1(ω3) = −76.29
Y1 Y1(ω2) = Y1(ω4) = 36.21
E[Y1] = −53.79
Y3(ω1) = Y3(ω3) = 48.71
Y3 Y3(ω2) = Y3(ω4) = −63.79
E[Y3] = 26.21 Y1 + Y3 = −27.58
Y2 15.82
Y4 11.20
Systemic risk=
∑
Yi -0.56
Groups: {X1,X4}, {X2}, {X3)
Y1(ω1) = −6.64, Y1(ω2) = 68.36
Y1 Y1(ω3) = −44.14, Y1(ω4) = 30.86
E[Y1] = 0.86
Y4(ω1) = 43.36, Y4(ω2) = −31.64
Y4 Y4(ω3) = 80.86, Y4(ω4) = 5.86
E[Y4] = 35.86 Y1 + Y4 = 36.72
Y2 15.82
Y3 15.82
Systemic risk=
∑
Yi 68.36
Groups: {X2,X3}, {X1}, {X4)
Y2(ω1) = Y2(ω3) = −58.97
Y2 Y2(ω2) = Y2(ω4) = 16.03
E[Y2] = −43.97
Y3(ω1) = Y3(ω3) = 16.03
Y3 Y (ω2) = Y3(ω4) = −58.97
E[Y3] = 1.03 Y2 + Y3 = −42.94
Y1 36.18
Y4 11.20
Systemic risk=
∑
Yi 4.44
Groups: {X2,X4}, {X1}, {X3)
Y2(ω1) = 5.86, Y2(ω2) = 43.36
Y2 Y2(ω3) = −31.64, Y2(ω4) = 5.86
E[Y2] = 5.86
Y4(ω1) = 5.85, Y4(ω2) = −31.65
Y4 Y (ω3) = 43.35, Y4(ω4) = 5.85
E[Y4] = 5.85 Y2 + Y4 = 11.71
Y1 36.18
Y3 15.82
Systemic risk=
∑
Yi 63.71
Groups: {X3,X4}, {X1}, {X2)
Y3(ω1) = 47.98, Y3(ω2) = 10.48
Y3 Y3(ω3) = 10.48, Y3(ω4) = −27.02
E[Y2] = 32.98
Y4(ω1) = −27.02, Y4(ω2) = 10.48
Y4 Y (ω3) = 10.48, Y4(ω4) = 47.98
E[Y4] = −12.02 Y3 + Y4 = 20.96
Y1 36.18
Y2 15.82
Systemic risk=
∑
Yi 72.96
Table 6: Case r = 2.
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Analogous computations hold in the case αi < 0. Summing up, we obtain
that
E
[
N∑
i=1
(Xi + Y i − di)−
]
=
N∑
i=1
E
[
(Xi + Y i − di)−
]
=
N∑
i=1
E
[
(Xi +mi − di)−
]
+
N∑
i=1
Iαi≥0 [(mi − di)Fi,S(di −mi, d)− (mi + αi − di)Fi,S(di −mi − αi, d)
+
∫ di−mi
di−mi−αi
∫ d
−∞
xfi,S(x, y)dydx
]
+
N∑
i=1
Iαi<0 [(mi − di)Fi,S(di −mi, d)− (mi + αi − di)Fi,S(di −mi − αi, d)
+
∫ di−mi
di−mi−αi
∫ d
−∞
xfi,S(x, y)dydx
]
=
N∑
i=1
E
[
(Xi +mi − di)−
]
+
N∑
i=1
[(mi − di)Fi,S(di −mi, d)− (mi + αi − di)Fi,S(di −mi − αi, d)
+
∫ di−mi
di−mi−αi
∫ d
−∞
xfi,S(x, y)dydx
]
=
N∑
i=1
E
[
(Xi +mi − di)−
]
+
N−1∑
i=1
[(mi − di)Fi,S(di −mi, d)− (mi + αi − di)Fi,S(di −mi − αi, d)
+
∫ di−mi
di−mi−αi
∫ d
−∞
xfi,S(x, y)dydx
]
+ (mN − dN )FN,S(dN −mN , d)− (mN −
N−1∑
j=1
αj − dN )FN,S(dN −mN
+
N−1∑
j=1
αj , d) +
∫ dN−mN
dN−mN+
∑N−1
j=1 αj
∫ d
−∞
xfN,S(x, y)dydx,
where in the last equality we have used the constraint
∑N
j=1 αj = 0. We now
denote by µi, σi the mean and the quadratic variation of X
i, i = 1, · · · , N ,
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and Φ(x) =
∫ x
+∞
1√
2pi
e−t2/2dt. Set f¯i,S(x, y) =
∫ y
−∞ fi,S(x, s)ds.
1. By computing the derivatives with respect to αi, i = 1, · · · , N − 1, we
obtain ∂φ∂αi = 0 if and only if
0 = λ
(
(mi + αi − di)f¯i,S(di −mi − αi, d)− Fi,S(di −mi − αi, d)
+ (di −mi − αi)
∫ d
−∞
fi,S(di −mi − αi, y)dy
+ FN,S(dN −mN +
N−1∑
j=1
αj , d)
− (mN −
N−1∑
j=1
αj − dN )f¯N,S(dN −mN +
N−1∑
j=1
αj , d)
+ (mN −
N−1∑
j=1
αj − dN )
∫ d
−∞
fN,S(dN −mN +
N−1∑
j=1
αj , y)dy
)
= λ
FN,S(dN −mN + N−1∑
j=1
αj , d)− Fi,S(di −mi − αi, d)
 .
We then obtain that the equation above has a solution if λ = 0 or
when
Fi,S(di −mi − αi, d) = FN,S(dN −mN +
N−1∑
j=1
αj , d) (A.2)
for i = 1, · · · , N − 1.
2. By computing the derivatives with respect to mi, for i = 1, · · · , N , we
obtain ∂φ∂mi = 0 if and only if
0 = 1 + λ
(
Φ(
di − µi −mi
σi
)− (mi − di)f¯i,S(di −mi, d) + Fi,S(di −mi, d)
−Fi,S(di −mi − αi, d) + (mi + αi − di)f¯i,S(di −mi − αi, d)
+(di −mi − αi)
∫ d
−∞
fi,S(di −mi − αi, y)− (di −mi)
∫ d
−∞
fi,S(di −mi, y)dy
)
= 1 + λ
Φ(di − µi −mi
σi
) + Fi,S(di −mi, d)− FN,S(dN −mN +
N−1∑
j=1
αj, d)
 ,
where we have used (5.8), (A.2) and the notation above. In particular
λ = −
Φ(dN − µN −mN
σN
) + FN,S(dN −mN , d)− FN,S(dN −mN +
N−1∑
j=1
αj , d)
−1 ,
(A.3)
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if the denominator is different from zero. By (A.3) we then obtain
Φ(
di − µi −mi
σi
) + Fi,S(di −mi, d)
= Φ(
dN − µN −mN
σN
) + FN,S(dN −mN , d), (A.4)
for i = 1, · · · , N − 1.
A.2 Example on a Finite Probability Space
We give the proof of the optimal solutions (6.5)-(6.11) in Section 6.
Proof. We restrict the proof to the case r = 0. The general case can be
obtained following the same steps. For further details on the proof in the
general case, we refer to Pastore [2014]. Note that the following computa-
tions apply in any other case when the derivatives of Ui are invertible for all
i = 1, · · · , N . We can rewrite the definition of ρ in this particular setting as
follows:
ρ(X) := inf
{
c ∈ R|
N∑
i=1
Y i = c,E
[
N∑
i=1
exp
(−αi(Xi + Y i))
]
≤ γ
}
. (A.5)
Note that for r = 0 we now have yNj := c −
∑N−1
i=1 y
i
j for j = 1, · · · ,M .
We compute ρ by using the method of Lagrange multipliers to minimize the
function
φ(c, y11 , · · · , y1M , · · · , yN−11 , · · · , yN−1M , λ)
= c+ λ
 M∑
j=1
pj
[
N−1∑
k=1
exp
(
−αk(Xk(ωj) + ykj )
)
+exp
(
−αN (XN (ωj) + c−
N−1∑
i=1
yij)
)]
− γ
)
.
We have:
1. By computing the derivatives with respect to ykj , k = 1, · · · , N − 1 ,
j = 1, · · · ,M : ∂φ
∂ykj
= 0 if and only if for all fixed j = 1, · · · ,M
αk exp
(
−αk(Xk(ωj) + ykj )
)
= αN exp
(
−αN (XN (ωj) + c−
N−1∑
i=1
yij)
)
.
(A.6)
This also implies that for all fixed j = 1, · · · ,M
αk exp
(
−αk(Xk(ωj) + ykj )
)
= α1 exp
(−α1(X1(ωj) + y1j )) (A.7)
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for all k = 1, · · · , N − 1, i.e.
ykj =
1
αk
[
α1X
1(ωj)− αkXk(ωj)− log α1
αk
+ α1y
1
j
]
. (A.8)
Furthermore, by (A.6) we obtain that
y1j =
1
α1βN
N∑
i=1
Xi(ωj)−X1(ωj)+ 1
α1βN
N∑
i=1
1
αi
log
α1
αi
+
1
α1βN
c, (A.9)
where βN =
∑N
k=1
1
αk
as before.
2. By computing the derivatives with respect to c: ∂φ∂c = 0 if and only if
0 = 1− αNλ
M∑
j=1
pj exp
(
−αN (XN (ωj) + c−
N−1∑
i=1
yij)
)
. (A.10)
We can insert (A.6) in (A.10) and obtain
0 = 1− αkλ
M∑
j=1
pj exp
(
−αk(Xk(ωj) + ykj )
)
,
i.e.
M∑
j=1
pj exp
(
−αk(Xk(ωj) + ykj )
)
=
1
αkλ
(A.11)
for all k = 1, · · · , N − 1.
3. By computing the derivatives with respect to λ: ∂φ∂λ = 0 if and only if
γ = E
N∑
i=1
exp
(−αi(Xi + Y i))
=
M∑
j=1
pj
[
N−1∑
k=1
exp
(
−αk(Xk(ωj) + ykj )
)
+ exp
(
−αN (XN (ωj) + c−
N−1∑
i=1
yij)
)]
.
(A.12)
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We now substitute (A.10) and (A.11) in (A.12) and obtain:
γ =
M∑
j=1
pj
(
N−1∑
k=1
exp
(
−αk(Xk(ωj) + ykj )
)
+exp
(
−αN (XN (ωj) + c−
N−1∑
i=1
yij)
))
=
N−1∑
k=1
M∑
j=1
pj exp
(
−αk(Xk(ωj) + ykj )
)
+
M∑
j=1
pj exp
(
−αN (XN (ωj) + c−
N−1∑
i=1
yij)
)
=
N−1∑
k=1
1
αkλ
+
1
αNλ
=
1
λ
N∑
k=1
1
αk
. (A.13)
Hence
λ =
1
γ
N∑
k=1
1
αk
=
βN
γ
. (A.14)
We now compute c by inserting (A.8), (A.9) and (A.14) in (A.11) for k = 1:
e
− c
βN
M∑
j=1
pj exp
(
− 1
βN
(
N∑
i=1
Xi(ωj) +
N∑
i=1
1
αi
log
α1
αi
)
)
=
γ
α1βN
. (A.15)
Hence the systemic risk measure, i.e. the optimal c, is given by
ρ(X) = c∗ = −βN log
[
γ
α1βNdN
]
, (A.16)
where dN =
∑M
j=1 pj exp
(
− 1βN
∑N
i=1X
i(ωj)− 1βN
∑N
i=1
1
αi
log α1αi
)
.
By substituting the optimal value for c in (A.8) and (A.9) we also obtain
the optimal allocations
ykj =
1
αkβN
N∑
i=1
Xi(ωj)−Xk(ωj)− 1
αk
log(
Xjα1
αk
)
+
1
αkβN
N∑
i=1
1
αi
log
α1
αi
− 1
αk
log
[
γ
αkβNd
]
,
for j = 1, · · · ,M and k = 1, · · · , N .
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